Thursday, October 8, 2026

The Patton Cult and its (Non-)Criticism in America

Some years ago the disgraced-but-never-canceled ex-FOX News host Bill O'Reilly "co-wrote" with Martin Dugard a series of histories linked by their titles all beginning with the word "Killing." This bespeaks their theme being the "killing" of something or someone, be it "killing," defeating, a military power (as in their history of the Revolutionary War, Killing Britain), or the death of a person, as in Killing Patton, O'Reilly and Dugard's book about General George S. Patton's part in World War II. To my knowledge these works did not exactly bring their authors the stature of a latterday Mommsen, but that latter title did succeed in arousing some controversy, in part because of the authors' "theory" that Stalin had Patton assassinated (bizarrely, after the car crash that so anticlimactically ended Patton's career and life), but also because O'Reilly glossed over many of the uglier aspects of the record, like Patton's Anti-Semitism, and his expression of that Anti-Semitism in his indefensible (and frankly quite stupid) attitude toward and treatment of concentration camp survivors.

It was a reminder of how divisive the figure of General George S. Patton has been in America, with his notorious slapping a shell-shocked soldier and snarling that he was a coward the least of it. As his detractors recall Patton he was an egomaniacal, racist, reactionary bully who embodied the depths of Anti-Communist lunacy in his raving against the Bonus Army he so eagerly helped crush at home, and in Europe, where, as he neglected his duties as military governor, he agitated for the beginning of World War III before World War II was even over by pushing a half-baked scheme of rallying what remained of the German army for a new Angriffskrieg against "the Russians" in order to turn Europe right back over to the heirs to the Nazis the Allies had spent six years fighting to defeat at the price of tens of millions of lives in a conflict bound to mean the deaths of tens of millions more--such that merely relating the most basic facts of his career makes him seem a left-winger's caricature of a military man, a real-life General Jack D. Ripper.

However, not only is it the case that there is much in Patton's biography that make him an unpalatable figure for many (and not just the confirmed leftists by any means), it also appears that his reputation as a military exemplar is not necessarily beyond question. Indeed, the extremity of his praises, the way in which those who die shortly after their victories get legends built around them, the extent to which he has been an icon of the right specifically, not in spite of but because of his image as egomaniacal, racist, reactionary bully embodying Anti-Communist lunacy at its most warmongering may suffice to make some suspicious that historians have treated him more favorably than he deserves to be. Additionally those who know little or nothing of the specifics of Patton's record but are aware of the larger course of the war may be made suspicious of his standing by the limited part American forces played in the European war in which he was a participant (as measured by man-months the campaigns in which the U.S. even participated comprising just five percent of the total ground fighting); that in the period of American participation the Western Allies undertook those ground campaigns at a time of their own choosing, after achieving control of the sea and the skies with the enemy usually considerably degraded from their peak strength by interdiction and air power (and of course, the far larger-scale and more exhausting fight in the east); that even when they shifted from the peripheral campaigns of the Mediterranean to the opening of a "Second Front" in Normandy the Germans were more anxious to block the British drive through its north, with its threat to the heart of Germany's industrial base in the Ruhr, than the American thrust through the south; and then when the German leadership recognized the war was lost, "fought to the last" on the Eastern Front as they deliberately opened the way for American and British forces rather than the Soviets they feared so much more to end up with as much of Germany's territory and as many of its prisoners as possible when hostilities ended; with all that means for the extent to which American forces faced the Germans at their most formidable, and the part that any American commander could have played in the victory. Moreover, the critically-minded reader would be alert to the way a generally rightward-leaning profession of military historiography's Anti-Communist and nationalist prejudices would have them downplaying the role of the Soviets, and even other Western nations, in favor of a more "patriotic" narrative emphasizing America's contributions to the land battle, and perhaps even suspect that the cult of Patton is at least partly a matter of overcompensation for the limits of the U.S.' actual role in the European ground war (the more in as this has come to loom larger in American consciousness than before)--all as needing to round out this preferred version of the record by providing a hero, Patton's aforementioned "traits" would have made him a very attractive candidate for the position to those thinking along such lines.

Of course, suspicions are just that, suspicions, but the fact remains that there are grounds for a lot of them, and that they have been a starting point for such investigation, and that in spite of the biases of their field historians have not wholly ignored them. Patton's reputation hinges on his penchant for high-speed, high-risk armored offensives whose plausibility and effectiveness was ultimately contingent on that aforementioned enemy weakness permitting them to succeed--the more in as Patton was less than mindful of the difficulties of the terrain he fought on, the limits of his supply lines, and the "strategic payoff" for which he was carrying out his operations. Thus did what seemed to work in North Africa work less well in the drive up a mountainous, highly defensible Italian peninsula which, after producing casualties disproportionate to the gains, proved a long, slow grind that might have gone on a good deal longer but for the more decisive action up north. Moreover, even after D-Day, in territory where Patton did have a far better chance to distinguish himself (and his performance in which is indeed the principal basis of the aforementioned legend), the same faults and tendencies and results were evident in the breakout from Normandy--such that even such a champion of Patton's reputation as Patton: A Genius for War author Colonel Carlo d'Este finds little good to say about the subsequent campaign in Lorraine, where even in the face of weak enemies (Hugh Cole notes that "Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men . . . still others consisting entirely of soldiers with stomach ulcers") Patton made only slow progress while suffering high casualties. Of course, this advance did eventually meet that counterstroke in the Battle of the Bulge he is so much credited with defeating, but it can seem that it was actually not Patton's Third Army but the First Army under the command of General Courtney Hodges which bore the brunt of the German attack, and in its response to it saved the day--after which battle, of course, the Germans had shot their last bolt, and the Western Allies' advance into Germany was considerably smoothed.

Indeed, more broadly assessing Patton historian Harry Yeide observes that unlike some of his counterparts on even the Western Allied side, like his rival Bernard Montgomery, he did not show himself a "multifaceted strategist"; Patton's supposedly singular accomplishments with regard to brisk, bold advances and "innovation" in achieving them were preceded and exceeded by the accomplishments of many of his German, and Soviet, counterparts; that even in the area of tactics that was Patton's claim to fame he was far from flawless, and indeed the aggressiveness that was supposed to be his great virtue absent as he hesitated in key moments; that he never faced the test of "difficult retreat under heavy enemy pressure"; and that on the basis of the more limited evidence of his performance he would have been ratable as "merely above average" within a pool of senior armored commanders such as Germany amassed during the war. "Above average" is not a dishonorable estimation, especially in that distinguished company, but all the same not quite what one would expect when measured against the height of the pedestal on which his admirers place him as a latterday God of War. Moreover, other scholars' remarks suggest that this is far from being the dimmest view one could take of his military record. Certainly Basil Liddell Hart, if according Patton credit for displaying the aggressiveness he thought generally lacking in the Anglo-American commanders, noted that he was so attack-minded as to not appreciate the virtues of the defensive, let alone skillfully combine attack with defense in the manner Hart regarded as the acme of skill, with all that (along with his insensitivity to terrain, his untimely hesitations, his limits as a strategist) implies about the outcome had Patton faced a less "convenient" opponent--such as one who had compelled him to command American forces in a "difficult retreat under heavy enemy pressure" for even a time.

Still, as has generally been the case with such marginalized facts, and their usage in reexamination of major events long after the conventional wisdom about them has formed and hardened, they would seem to have had little effect on the conventional wisdom about the figure. The result is that anyone looking for an attempt at the kind of biography that we see so many of, an answer to hagiography with a brutal takedown, searches in vain for any such work about Patton. Moreover any such work would seem unlikely to be written anytime soon given the inclinations of scholars, publishers, readers of military history, with all that means for the historiography, and the image the name George S. Patton is likely to go on conjuring up not just for those who know the history, but those who have only the hazier impressions of that history that "reputations" help to produce. All of this has its significance not just for the record of a particular general in a particular war, but the impressions the laity and experts alike have about generalship and warfare more generally, with the Patton legend likely leaving them more rather than less clear about what it takes to win wars rather than merely start them--not least, what aggressiveness alone can accomplish in war.

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