Thursday, October 8, 2026

The "Four Schools" View of American International Relations Thought

I first encountered the practice of categorizing American thinking about the country's relations with the rest of the world as, variously, "Jeffersonianism" (what some awkwardly call "isolationism"), "Jacksonianism" (nationalism, of a bigoted, pugnacious, even predatory kind), "Hamiltonianism" (realpolitik of the sort exemplified by the nineteenth century European balance of power), and "Wilsonianism" ("liberal internationalism" of the kind for which the neoconservatives bear the standard today) in Charles Kupchan's The End of the American Era. That book, like Jeremy Rifkin's The European Dream and T.R. Reid's The United States of Europe part of that outpouring of works of the early '00s that anticipated the European Union becoming the world's second superpower and presumed to tell us what that development would mean for the world has, like those other works, dated very, very badly. However, that taxonomy of American foreign policy approaches, a retailing of the ideas Walter Russell Mead presented in his then-recent Special Providence, stayed with me, if less because of its virtues than its failings. There is the extent to which the system, for all Mead's admitted effort in that book to be nuanced, implies a measure of parity between four distinct lines of thought and conduct. And there is what is in back of them, the analyst's, very characteristically for American scholarship, beginning not with interests, but with culture. (Thus does Mead explain Jacksonianism as what others would call a right-wing romantic's stereotype of Scotch-Irish culture translated into foreign policy, Wilsonianism as an outgrowth of the country's Protestant missionary tradition, etc.).

As a practical matter it seems to me that Jeffersonianism was rarely if ever more than a pious aspiration, with the illusion that it was ever policy a function of the only way in which one could speak of the U.S. as ever having enjoyed "isolation," the combination of distance and military weakness that made it nearly a non-factor in the nineteenth century European balance of power. Said illusion collapsed very, very quickly as technological progress overcame distance, and American power became so weighty that as soon as it took a serious interest in them it almost instantly became the foremost factor in European affairs.

That leaves the other three schools, Jacksonianism, Hamiltonianism and Wilsonianism as more relevant, though less as three approaches than three sides of one approach, namely the preferred approach of the American "Establishment"'s pursuit of what it has traditionally deemed the "national interest." Certainly Hamiltonian realpolitik and Wilsonian liberal internationalism have never been separate, cannot be separate, for a capitalist, trading nation which needs the trade of the world, and for which anything obstructing that trade is a threat to American (elite's) material interests, and power. That most certainly included old-fashioned European-style imperialism, right-wing autarkism of the kind attempted by Hitler or World War II-era Japan, anti-colonial nationalism of the Mossadegh type, or socialism in its Communist and other forms, such that one can speak of American realpolitik, in line with its modern sensitivity to the economic foundations of power, simply incorporating altertness to the economic facts of life along the lines relevant to the particular U.S. situation. At the same time the liberal internationalist was never oblivious to the practicalities of power, one unlikely to have much success in promoting the American brand of (highly conservative) liberalism, or any other political or economic system, without the power to do it, with all that meant for attention to the balance of power in the international system. Thus is the controversial leaked early draft of the Defense Policy Guidance, FY 1994-1999 (the famous "Wolfowitz Doctrine" document) exemplary. Setting as the country's top national security goal "survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure," the "promotion, establishment and expansion of democracy and free market institutions worldwide" followed immediately from that--the liberal order and its open economy inextricable from the realist goal of preserving the sovereignty of the state. At the same time the first of the Defense Strategy Objectives that followed from those national security goals was "prevent[ing] the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere" comparable in threat to the collapsed Soviet Union, which meant a "regional defense strategy" aimed at preventing "any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power"--the liberal internationalist goal requiring a very realist U.S. participation in multiple regional balances of power in order to sustain that open economic order inseparable from its basic security.

Acknowledging the reality--that in practice American foreign policy has been driven by elite reading of the "national interest" in a way that has made American realism and American international liberalism inseparable--makes it easier to see how these are, in turn, inseparable from Jacksonianism, again a matter of national "self-assertion" in pursuit of that "national interest." All other things being equal American elites prefer to pursue said "interest" in line with international law and with the sanction of international institutions, with the support of America's allies and the blessing of the international community--but no more than the elite of any other country do they treat not having them as deal-breakers, with reference to this policy as Wilsonian, that one as Jacksonian, confusing the reality that given circumstances see them incline to a more brazen approach if it seems to them advantageous. (Thus going to war with Iraq in 1991 the United States did it one way, and in 2003 did it a very different way--under two Presidents of the same political party, and indeed the same immediate family, a mere dozen years apart.) At the same time one ought to remember that elites have tended to dress up realist-liberal internationalist policies in Jacksonian garb for domestic consumption, knowing full well that both the calculus of foreign ministers and "going forth in search of monsters to destroy" have little public appeal, but that stoking outrage against, fear of, hate of a designated Enemy can get the population behind a war. Indeed, post-Vietnam the policy elite was anxious that the American public might not be responsive to such appeals anymore, and ecstatic when it seemed to do so in 1991 Gulf War--and endeavored to keep the public in a state of war fever ever since, a forever war fever to sustain the forever war on which they were so intent, and to which they have been committed ever since.

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