Starting in 1959 the Northrop Corporation produced over 2,600 copies of the various versions of the F-5 fighter over a period of nearly three decades (the last F-5 rolling off the production line in 1987).* Those planes entered service with the armed forces of over thirty countries, including the United States' Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps; the air forces of fellow North Atlantic Treaty Organization members Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey; and beyond the NATO alliance, those of other important American allies such as South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia and (the Shah's) Iran. In the service of those forces flyers of that plane saw action in several conflicts, including a number of interstate wars (the largest and most important of them likely the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, but also the 1977 Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the 1979 Yemenite war between what were then North and South Yemen).**
With the help of upgrades many of those militaries which acquired the aircraft continue to fly them down to this day.
Still, the plane's profile seems relatively low in aviation history, at least in American discussion. One reason may be the anomalous character of the aircraft given how we think about fighter aircraft "generations"--a light fighter that did not quite fit in with the trend already evident in its day with the second-generation interceptors' increasingly stressing high-technology combat in that way epitomized by planes like the U.S. Air Force's "Century Series" aircraft and the U.S. Navy's F-14 Tomcat, heavier multirole aircraft like the third-generation F-4 Phantom, and the fourth-generation F-15 Eagle. This is all the more the case in as, in spite of the plane's finding so many takers, there having been no real follow-up, the F-20 Tigershark that was a further development of the aircraft ultimately canceled for lack of customers (as, instead, the higher-tech F-16 and F-18 triumphed in the marketplace). Indeed, it is worth remembering that in U.S. service the plane's primary usage was as an "aggressor" aircraft, simulating Soviet MiG-17s and MiG-21s, rather than as a front-line fighter (all as, ironically, the Soviets seem to have used the F-5s they got from Ethiopia and Vietnam after those countries' changes in government in the same role, as aggressor aircraft against which to train their own pilots). All of that has the plane off the main path of fighter development--even if it may be credited with playing a noteworthy part in the post-World War II history of the fighter aircraft.
* The F-5 lineage includes both the earlier F-5 A and B "Freedom Fighter" and the later F-5 E and F "Tiger II," a larger, heavier plane with a more powerful engine that also incorporated the radar lacking in the Freedom Fighter, but remained a light jet next to others like the "Century Series" fighters, or the F-4 Phantom. (Even the first of the Century Series, the F-100 Super Sabre, is twice as heavy as the F-5 Tiger when empty.)
** Iran received its F-5s (like its F-4 Phantoms and the F-14 Tomcats for which it was the only customer but the U.S.) in the era of the Shah's rule, but the planes have apparently remained in service with the country's successor government down to the present.
Monday, June 3, 2024
Saturday, March 16, 2024
Emmanuel Todd's La Défaite de l’Occident Gets Noticed By the American Press
As I previously remarked, the response to Emmanuel Todd's latest (La Défaite de l’Occident--in English, The Defeat of the West) seems to have been strongest on the right, which was predictably delighted by much of what Todd (though not a rightist, and in the past and even the new book having said much not pleasing to the right) wrote here about religion, gender and education. Indeed, the first review of his book I spotted in a major English-language publication was Scott McConnell's in The American Conservative, while when The New York Times recently ran a guest essay about Todd's book it was by the Claremont Institute's Christopher Caldwell (in yet another reminder of just how off the mark are those who think the Times a "left" or even a "liberal" paper rather than the centrist one it actually is, and just what exactly "centrism" means in a media outlet where who gets a platform and who does not are concerned).*
It was accordingly noteworthy that Michael Ledger-Lomas reviewed the book for the Jacobin (a publication hardly likely to turn to a far right commentator for their view of this book).
Ledger-Lomas' piece is notable for its attentiveness to Emmanuel Todd's history as a social scientist, from his formative influences in his youth, to his embrace of the "anthropological turn" in French intellectual life and establishment of a reputation for himself as a thinker with 1976's The Final Fall to the present--albeit with a distinct slant. Skipping over Todd's After the Empire, which seemed to me an important stepping stone toward this book's argument (and skipping over, too, Todd's Lineages of the Feminine, which also seems to me important given what he argues here), Ledger-Lomas slights the more material aspects of Todd's case as he (perhaps not unreasonably) emphasizes their more-discussed claims about the passing of the Protestantism of America and northern Europe from the "zombie" stage to the "zero" stage and its implications--which Ledger-Lomas treats rather critically. Indeed, Ledger-Lomas contends that while Todd's "portrait of America and Europe's post-Christian nihilism" can be "gripping" and even "overwhelming," and may even appear "vindicated" by particular foreign policies, the book is also "less scientific and more anecdotal" than Todd's prior works, with this posing special risks inasmuch as Todd's book is so much devoted to the "power of a political unconscious" in which "the analyst will find . . . whatever they find amusing or convenient to put there." Ledger-Lomas particularly argues for the hugely important discussion of "dechristianization" suffering from a "breezy crudity," reflected in Todd's identification of the "zero moment" for Protestantism with the acceptance of gay marriage seeming to him "strangely arbitrary." Indeed, Ledger-Lomas finds Todd's optimism about Russia and pessimism about Europe both misplaced--and along with these, the expectation of some form of German-Russian rapprochement implausible.
The result is that while it seems to me that there is much here that seems to me essential to the book and meriting more mention than it got in an over three thousand word review (Ledger-Lomas making only the slightest reference to Todd's discussions of Western deindustrialization, and none at all to Russia's soft power, for example), in discussing what he does regard as the core of the book Ledger-Lomas eschews both the uncritical embrace of those on the right who find Todd's argument a validation of their views, and the sneering dismissal of critics like Le Monde's Florent Georgesco, to offer that rarity--a balanced consideration of this French bestseller now getting so much press in a country where books not available in English are usually not even recognized as existing at all.
It was accordingly noteworthy that Michael Ledger-Lomas reviewed the book for the Jacobin (a publication hardly likely to turn to a far right commentator for their view of this book).
Ledger-Lomas' piece is notable for its attentiveness to Emmanuel Todd's history as a social scientist, from his formative influences in his youth, to his embrace of the "anthropological turn" in French intellectual life and establishment of a reputation for himself as a thinker with 1976's The Final Fall to the present--albeit with a distinct slant. Skipping over Todd's After the Empire, which seemed to me an important stepping stone toward this book's argument (and skipping over, too, Todd's Lineages of the Feminine, which also seems to me important given what he argues here), Ledger-Lomas slights the more material aspects of Todd's case as he (perhaps not unreasonably) emphasizes their more-discussed claims about the passing of the Protestantism of America and northern Europe from the "zombie" stage to the "zero" stage and its implications--which Ledger-Lomas treats rather critically. Indeed, Ledger-Lomas contends that while Todd's "portrait of America and Europe's post-Christian nihilism" can be "gripping" and even "overwhelming," and may even appear "vindicated" by particular foreign policies, the book is also "less scientific and more anecdotal" than Todd's prior works, with this posing special risks inasmuch as Todd's book is so much devoted to the "power of a political unconscious" in which "the analyst will find . . . whatever they find amusing or convenient to put there." Ledger-Lomas particularly argues for the hugely important discussion of "dechristianization" suffering from a "breezy crudity," reflected in Todd's identification of the "zero moment" for Protestantism with the acceptance of gay marriage seeming to him "strangely arbitrary." Indeed, Ledger-Lomas finds Todd's optimism about Russia and pessimism about Europe both misplaced--and along with these, the expectation of some form of German-Russian rapprochement implausible.
The result is that while it seems to me that there is much here that seems to me essential to the book and meriting more mention than it got in an over three thousand word review (Ledger-Lomas making only the slightest reference to Todd's discussions of Western deindustrialization, and none at all to Russia's soft power, for example), in discussing what he does regard as the core of the book Ledger-Lomas eschews both the uncritical embrace of those on the right who find Todd's argument a validation of their views, and the sneering dismissal of critics like Le Monde's Florent Georgesco, to offer that rarity--a balanced consideration of this French bestseller now getting so much press in a country where books not available in English are usually not even recognized as existing at all.
The Talent Disrupted Study on College Graduates' Employment Outcomes: Some Thoughts
The Strada Education Foundation's new study of the employment outcomes of four-year college graduates, "Talented Disrupted," is making the rounds of the news.
The content of the study, which concentrates on "underemployment" among these graduates (their working jobs that do not require four-year college degrees a year after graduation), affirms the conventional wisdom on many a point. Yes, a humanities degree is more likely to lead to underemployment than, for example, an engineering degree. Yes, certain demographics suffer more than others (with no surprises to be found here regarding which ones), while the problem is bigger in some U.S. states than others (and, again, nothing striking me as very surprising on that score here). And so on and so forth. Yet there was much in the numbers, at least, that will seem surprising to those who abide by the conventional wisdom, not least that
* Over half of college graduates are underemployed, such that a college graduate has a less than even chance of being employed in a job actually requiring a college degree (never mind their particular degree) a full year after graduation.
* The major a student chooses is more important than the school they went to--a student with an in-demand major from an "inclusive" school less likely to be underemployed than a student with a less in-demand major from a selective, elite, school (contrary to stupid claims such as "a Harvard graduate who majors in somersaults will be able to find some kind of job to pay the bills").
* Where differences in the employment prospects of majors are concerned even those majors with the lowest rate of underemployment still leave the degree-holder a 1 in 4 chance of being underemployed.
* There is significant underemployment among the STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) majors, with engineering graduates having a 26 percent rate of underemployment, the figure 35 percent for majors in mathematics and statistics, and 36 percent among computer science graduates--while the underemployment rate is an appalling 44 percent for physical science majors and 47 percent for majors in biology and the biomedical fields.
* The underemployment rate among business majors differs immensely depending on how "math-intensive" their subject is. Those business majors that are math-intensive, like finance and accounting, have a "low" underemployment rate of 29 percent, but those that are not math-intensive, like marketing or management, have a rate of 57 percent--which is actually slightly worse than the figure for such "useless" majors as the social sciences (51 percent), communications, journalism and related programs (53 percent), psychology (53 percent), the visual and performing arts (54 percent), and the humanities (55 percent).
In short, the prospects for underemployment of college graduates are worse than fifty-fifty, the "safest" majors still carry significant risk (worse than 1 in 4 for engineering graduates!), while many "STEM" and business majors are in almost as much danger on this score as the despised social sciences-communications-arts-humanities majors, and attendance of an elite school falls short of saving those who picked their majors without an eye to their later economic prospects. Moreover, all this matters because those who become underemployed have a hard time "escaping" that condition, especially if they were likely to end up underemployed to begin with.
Considering the situation in, as the study terms it, a "historically tight" labor market, with all that implies for these being particularly good times rather than bad ones, it seems far from unreasonable that many young people are becoming much more cautious about college than before--both what they choose to study, and whether they decide to go at all. Indeed, as I have remarked before, we may be starting to see a fundamental change in the way we think about higher education--one arguably long overdue.
The content of the study, which concentrates on "underemployment" among these graduates (their working jobs that do not require four-year college degrees a year after graduation), affirms the conventional wisdom on many a point. Yes, a humanities degree is more likely to lead to underemployment than, for example, an engineering degree. Yes, certain demographics suffer more than others (with no surprises to be found here regarding which ones), while the problem is bigger in some U.S. states than others (and, again, nothing striking me as very surprising on that score here). And so on and so forth. Yet there was much in the numbers, at least, that will seem surprising to those who abide by the conventional wisdom, not least that
* Over half of college graduates are underemployed, such that a college graduate has a less than even chance of being employed in a job actually requiring a college degree (never mind their particular degree) a full year after graduation.
* The major a student chooses is more important than the school they went to--a student with an in-demand major from an "inclusive" school less likely to be underemployed than a student with a less in-demand major from a selective, elite, school (contrary to stupid claims such as "a Harvard graduate who majors in somersaults will be able to find some kind of job to pay the bills").
* Where differences in the employment prospects of majors are concerned even those majors with the lowest rate of underemployment still leave the degree-holder a 1 in 4 chance of being underemployed.
* There is significant underemployment among the STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) majors, with engineering graduates having a 26 percent rate of underemployment, the figure 35 percent for majors in mathematics and statistics, and 36 percent among computer science graduates--while the underemployment rate is an appalling 44 percent for physical science majors and 47 percent for majors in biology and the biomedical fields.
* The underemployment rate among business majors differs immensely depending on how "math-intensive" their subject is. Those business majors that are math-intensive, like finance and accounting, have a "low" underemployment rate of 29 percent, but those that are not math-intensive, like marketing or management, have a rate of 57 percent--which is actually slightly worse than the figure for such "useless" majors as the social sciences (51 percent), communications, journalism and related programs (53 percent), psychology (53 percent), the visual and performing arts (54 percent), and the humanities (55 percent).
In short, the prospects for underemployment of college graduates are worse than fifty-fifty, the "safest" majors still carry significant risk (worse than 1 in 4 for engineering graduates!), while many "STEM" and business majors are in almost as much danger on this score as the despised social sciences-communications-arts-humanities majors, and attendance of an elite school falls short of saving those who picked their majors without an eye to their later economic prospects. Moreover, all this matters because those who become underemployed have a hard time "escaping" that condition, especially if they were likely to end up underemployed to begin with.
Considering the situation in, as the study terms it, a "historically tight" labor market, with all that implies for these being particularly good times rather than bad ones, it seems far from unreasonable that many young people are becoming much more cautious about college than before--both what they choose to study, and whether they decide to go at all. Indeed, as I have remarked before, we may be starting to see a fundamental change in the way we think about higher education--one arguably long overdue.
American-Style Centrism and French Politics
In writing about centrism my emphasis has generally been on American political discourse, and the American political spectrum, over the course of American history. However, reflecting the fact that centrism is an updated classical conservatism extending far beyond the American tradition (indeed, originated in Western Europe), and that American politics has unavoidably influenced politics elsewhere (especially within other Western nations), it is easy enough to find similar thinking elsewhere--and indeed I had occasion to write about such centrism in the British Labour Party, and especially the evidences of it under Keir Starmer's leadership.
Some time ago Jacob Collins had occasion in a profile of Bernard-Henri Lévy to point out the presence of the essentially tendency in French politics, with Lévy a key exponent via his particular brand of anti-leftism equating all social change with totalitarianism horseshoe theory-style, and exalting a "pragmatic" capitalist model as the only viable path for modern societies. Indeed, Collins explicitly points out the specifically American precedent, mentioning Daniel Bell's The End of Ideology, Hannah Arendt's theorizing, and others that made Lévy a latecomer to the game back in the 1970s, but nevertheless joining it in a moment in which, in France at least, doing so could be the basis of a long run as an intellectual "rock star" due to the epochal turn then just getting underway in the political life of France and the rest of the world.
Some time ago Jacob Collins had occasion in a profile of Bernard-Henri Lévy to point out the presence of the essentially tendency in French politics, with Lévy a key exponent via his particular brand of anti-leftism equating all social change with totalitarianism horseshoe theory-style, and exalting a "pragmatic" capitalist model as the only viable path for modern societies. Indeed, Collins explicitly points out the specifically American precedent, mentioning Daniel Bell's The End of Ideology, Hannah Arendt's theorizing, and others that made Lévy a latecomer to the game back in the 1970s, but nevertheless joining it in a moment in which, in France at least, doing so could be the basis of a long run as an intellectual "rock star" due to the epochal turn then just getting underway in the political life of France and the rest of the world.
Britain's Defense Policy and Armed Forces (Post-1945)
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of the post-1945 history of Britain's defense policy.
"The Evolution of Britain's Defense Posture From 1945 to the Present: An Outline." (2022)
"The Evolution of Britain's Defense Posture, 1945-1979." (2019)
"Foundations of Semi-Superpower Status: Financing Britain's Defense Posture, 1945-1971." (2018)
"The Restructuring of Britain's Navy, 1945-1979." (2019)
"The British Carrier Force, 1945-1979." (2019)
"The British Defence Reviews of the 1990s and Their Legacy." (2021)
The 2021 British Defence Review and the British 'Tilt to the Indo-Pacific.'" (2021)
"'Is the Debate About Reviving Conscription in Britain Really About Conscription at All?' A Note on the Recent Discourse About Conscription in Britain." (2024)
"The Evolution of Britain's Defense Posture From 1945 to the Present: An Outline." (2022)
"The Evolution of Britain's Defense Posture, 1945-1979." (2019)
"Foundations of Semi-Superpower Status: Financing Britain's Defense Posture, 1945-1971." (2018)
"The Restructuring of Britain's Navy, 1945-1979." (2019)
"The British Carrier Force, 1945-1979." (2019)
"The British Defence Reviews of the 1990s and Their Legacy." (2021)
The 2021 British Defence Review and the British 'Tilt to the Indo-Pacific.'" (2021)
"'Is the Debate About Reviving Conscription in Britain Really About Conscription at All?' A Note on the Recent Discourse About Conscription in Britain." (2024)
My SSRN (Social Science Research Network)-Published Papers
I have been publishing through the Social Science Research Network since 2018, and the total number now up came to 170 at last count.
Given the number it seems to me appropriate to do something about organizing them for the reader--and so I have decided to here organize them by subject, allotting a page of this blog to each of those subjects that I have found myself writing about time and again. Where its subject matter makes this appropriate, I have listed some papers on more than one page, or even under more than one heading.
The links to those subject pages are listed below in alphabetical order.
Britain's Defense Policy and Armed Forces (Post-1945).
Deindustrialization.
Economic Growth After 1973.
The "Information Age."
The "Middle Class."
The 1990s.
Neoliberalism.
Political Centrism.
The Politics of the Media.
"The Unipolar Moment."
Given the number it seems to me appropriate to do something about organizing them for the reader--and so I have decided to here organize them by subject, allotting a page of this blog to each of those subjects that I have found myself writing about time and again. Where its subject matter makes this appropriate, I have listed some papers on more than one page, or even under more than one heading.
The links to those subject pages are listed below in alphabetical order.
Britain's Defense Policy and Armed Forces (Post-1945).
Deindustrialization.
Economic Growth After 1973.
The "Information Age."
The "Middle Class."
The 1990s.
Neoliberalism.
Political Centrism.
The Politics of the Media.
"The Unipolar Moment."
Deindustrialization
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of deindustrialization in the United States and other countries, particularly the U.S. and Britain.
Most of the papers are concerned with attempts to quantify manufacturing output in various ways (and in cases, other material aspects of deindustrialization susceptible to quantification, like the trend in regard to manufacturing equipment stocks) for the purposes of better understanding the issue.
Deindustrialization (U.S.)
"Discussing Deindustrialization: A Note." (2024)
"'What Do the Numbers Actually Say?': American Per Capita Manufacturing Output 1947-2018, the Consumer Price Index, and the Question of Deindustrialization." (2022)
"'American Per Capita Manufacturing Output 1947-2018, the Consumer Price Index, and the Question of Deindustrialization': A Supplementary Data Set and Associated Notes." (2024)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Restructuring of the Economy: A Survey of the Data." (2022)
"Private Fixed Assets, Value Added and the Trade Balance: A Note on the Trends in the U.S. Manufacturing and FIRE Sectors at the Per Capita Level." (2022)
"'What Do the Numbers Actually Say?': A Decade-By-Decade View of U.S. Manufacturing Value Added." (2022)
"The Deindustrialization of Michigan: Notes on the Available Data." (2022)
"The Deindustrialization of Los Angeles? A Note." (2022)
"The Complexities of Deindustrialization: A Note." (2022)
"'Do We Still Make Things in America?': Are Perceptions of Deindustrialization Exaggerated?" (2022)
"Comparative Deindustrialization: A Note on American and British Manufacturing Since the 1970s." (2021)
"Per Capita Manufacturing Output From 1970 On: The United States, Britain, Germany and Japan." (2022)
Deindustrialization (Other Countries)
"Assessing Manufacturing Output Over Time: A Note on The Case of Britain." (2022)
"'Did Margaret Thatcher Destroy British Manufacturing?': A Note." (2021)
"Comparative Deindustrialization: A Note on American and British Manufacturing Since the 1970s." (2021)
"The Deindustrialization of the French Economy: A Note." (2023)
"Per Capita Manufacturing Output From 1970 On: The United States, Britain, Germany and Japan." (2022)
"Is the G-7 Ceasing to be Relevant?" (2022)
Most of the papers are concerned with attempts to quantify manufacturing output in various ways (and in cases, other material aspects of deindustrialization susceptible to quantification, like the trend in regard to manufacturing equipment stocks) for the purposes of better understanding the issue.
Deindustrialization (U.S.)
"Discussing Deindustrialization: A Note." (2024)
"'What Do the Numbers Actually Say?': American Per Capita Manufacturing Output 1947-2018, the Consumer Price Index, and the Question of Deindustrialization." (2022)
"'American Per Capita Manufacturing Output 1947-2018, the Consumer Price Index, and the Question of Deindustrialization': A Supplementary Data Set and Associated Notes." (2024)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Restructuring of the Economy: A Survey of the Data." (2022)
"Private Fixed Assets, Value Added and the Trade Balance: A Note on the Trends in the U.S. Manufacturing and FIRE Sectors at the Per Capita Level." (2022)
"'What Do the Numbers Actually Say?': A Decade-By-Decade View of U.S. Manufacturing Value Added." (2022)
"The Deindustrialization of Michigan: Notes on the Available Data." (2022)
"The Deindustrialization of Los Angeles? A Note." (2022)
"The Complexities of Deindustrialization: A Note." (2022)
"'Do We Still Make Things in America?': Are Perceptions of Deindustrialization Exaggerated?" (2022)
"Comparative Deindustrialization: A Note on American and British Manufacturing Since the 1970s." (2021)
"Per Capita Manufacturing Output From 1970 On: The United States, Britain, Germany and Japan." (2022)
Deindustrialization (Other Countries)
"Assessing Manufacturing Output Over Time: A Note on The Case of Britain." (2022)
"'Did Margaret Thatcher Destroy British Manufacturing?': A Note." (2021)
"Comparative Deindustrialization: A Note on American and British Manufacturing Since the 1970s." (2021)
"The Deindustrialization of the French Economy: A Note." (2023)
"Per Capita Manufacturing Output From 1970 On: The United States, Britain, Germany and Japan." (2022)
"Is the G-7 Ceasing to be Relevant?" (2022)
Economic Growth After 1973
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of economic growth since the end of the post-war boom (commonly identified with the shocks of 1973).
"The Neoliberal Record: Growth: A Second Look." (2020)
"Economic Growth Since 1973: A Closer Look at the American Experience." (2020)
"The Consumer Price Index and Global Economic Growth in the Twenty-First Century: A Note." (2022)
"The Consumer Price Index and the Estimation of Real Gross Domestic Product Growth: A Note." (2022)
"Is it Possible That Outside China Per Capita Gross World Product Has Not Grown in a Generation?: A Note." (2023)
"Are Economic Analysts Underestimating Economic and Social Stress--and the Potential for Political Instability With It?: A Note." (2022)
"How Does Japan's Economic Performance Look When We Take into Account its Shrinking Working-Age Population?" (2022)
"Rising Complexity, Diminishing Returns, Shrinking Slack: Revisiting the Evidence." (2018)
"The Special Conditions of the Post-War Economic Boom: A Note." (2022)
"U.S. Defense Expenditure and Gross World Product in the Post-World War II Era: A Note." (2022)
"What if the Post-War Boom Had Simply Continued?: Notes on an Economic Counterfactual." (2022)
"The Neoliberal Record: Growth: A Second Look." (2020)
"Economic Growth Since 1973: A Closer Look at the American Experience." (2020)
"The Consumer Price Index and Global Economic Growth in the Twenty-First Century: A Note." (2022)
"The Consumer Price Index and the Estimation of Real Gross Domestic Product Growth: A Note." (2022)
"Is it Possible That Outside China Per Capita Gross World Product Has Not Grown in a Generation?: A Note." (2023)
"Are Economic Analysts Underestimating Economic and Social Stress--and the Potential for Political Instability With It?: A Note." (2022)
"How Does Japan's Economic Performance Look When We Take into Account its Shrinking Working-Age Population?" (2022)
"Rising Complexity, Diminishing Returns, Shrinking Slack: Revisiting the Evidence." (2018)
"The Special Conditions of the Post-War Economic Boom: A Note." (2022)
"U.S. Defense Expenditure and Gross World Product in the Post-World War II Era: A Note." (2022)
"What if the Post-War Boom Had Simply Continued?: Notes on an Economic Counterfactual." (2022)
The "Information Age"
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of "the information age" as previously discussed by its theorists, and the (very different) reality in which we actually live.
"The 'Information Age' Narrative and the Deflection of the Declinist Critique: A Note on the Tech Boom of the 1990s and Its Impact on American Politics." (2023)
"The Information Age Promise of Dematerialization: A Note." (2024)
"The Mood of America in the 1990s: A Note on the American Political Imagination After the Cold War." (2024)
"The Unipolar Moment and the Inflated Technological Expectations of the 1990s: A Note." (2022)
"'The 1990s Are Over': A Note on the Decline of Neoliberalism and the End of Unipolarity." (2022)
"The False Dawn of Information Age Warfare and the Industrial Reality of the Twenty-First Century: A Note." (2024)
"Cyber-Utopianism and Reality: A Note on the Politics of the Internet." (2024)
"To What Extent Was the Left Ever Actually 'Cyber-Utopian?': A Note." (2024)
"The Ascent of the Internet and the Ascent of the Culture War in American Political Life: A Note." (2024)
"Is a Flight into Virtuality Already Underway? A Consideration of Changing Lifeways in the Early Twenty-First Century." (2021)
"The 'Information Age' Narrative and the Deflection of the Declinist Critique: A Note on the Tech Boom of the 1990s and Its Impact on American Politics." (2023)
"The Information Age Promise of Dematerialization: A Note." (2024)
"The Mood of America in the 1990s: A Note on the American Political Imagination After the Cold War." (2024)
"The Unipolar Moment and the Inflated Technological Expectations of the 1990s: A Note." (2022)
"'The 1990s Are Over': A Note on the Decline of Neoliberalism and the End of Unipolarity." (2022)
"The False Dawn of Information Age Warfare and the Industrial Reality of the Twenty-First Century: A Note." (2024)
"Cyber-Utopianism and Reality: A Note on the Politics of the Internet." (2024)
"To What Extent Was the Left Ever Actually 'Cyber-Utopian?': A Note." (2024)
"The Ascent of the Internet and the Ascent of the Culture War in American Political Life: A Note." (2024)
"Is a Flight into Virtuality Already Underway? A Consideration of Changing Lifeways in the Early Twenty-First Century." (2021)
The "Middle Class"
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of what is so commonly called "the middle class." Central to the concern of this line of research has been the ambiguity of the term as commonly used--and the effort to offer a more meaningful standard as a basis for discussing just how extensive that class may have been in the past, and what has become of it since the mid-twentieth century.
The Definition of Middle Classness
"'What Qualifies a Household's Living Standard as Middle Class?' A Note." (2021)
"Of the Middle Class and the Quasi-Middle Class: A Note." (2023)
"Public Poverty and the Middle Class Living Standard: A Note." (2021)
The Decline of the Middle Class
"The Remaking--and Decline--of the Middle Class: A Note." (2021)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Ambiguities of the Middle Class' Fortunes Between the Mid-Twentieth Century and Today: A Note." (2023)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and Quasi-Middle Classness: A Note." (2023)
"U.S. Average and Median Hourly Compensation and Per Capita Gross Domestic Product: The Trend of the Last Half Century." (2022)
"The Declining Economic Viability of the Single-Income Household: A Note on the Fortunes of the Middle Class." (2022)
"The Four Year College Degree and the Middle Class Living Standard: A Tenuous Relationship." (2022)
"Natality, Senescence and the Quasi-Middle Class in the Neoliberal Era: A Note." (2023)
"The American Middle Class in the Twenty-First Century: Four Theses." (2022)
The Definition of Middle Classness
"'What Qualifies a Household's Living Standard as Middle Class?' A Note." (2021)
"Of the Middle Class and the Quasi-Middle Class: A Note." (2023)
"Public Poverty and the Middle Class Living Standard: A Note." (2021)
The Decline of the Middle Class
"The Remaking--and Decline--of the Middle Class: A Note." (2021)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Ambiguities of the Middle Class' Fortunes Between the Mid-Twentieth Century and Today: A Note." (2023)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and Quasi-Middle Classness: A Note." (2023)
"U.S. Average and Median Hourly Compensation and Per Capita Gross Domestic Product: The Trend of the Last Half Century." (2022)
"The Declining Economic Viability of the Single-Income Household: A Note on the Fortunes of the Middle Class." (2022)
"The Four Year College Degree and the Middle Class Living Standard: A Tenuous Relationship." (2022)
"Natality, Senescence and the Quasi-Middle Class in the Neoliberal Era: A Note." (2023)
"The American Middle Class in the Twenty-First Century: Four Theses." (2022)
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