This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of economic growth since the end of the post-war boom (commonly identified with the shocks of 1973).
"The Neoliberal Record: Growth: A Second Look." (2020)
"Economic Growth Since 1973: A Closer Look at the American Experience." (2020)
"The Consumer Price Index and Global Economic Growth in the Twenty-First Century: A Note." (2022)
"The Consumer Price Index and the Estimation of Real Gross Domestic Product Growth: A Note." (2022)
"Is it Possible That Outside China Per Capita Gross World Product Has Not Grown in a Generation?: A Note." (2023)
"Are Economic Analysts Underestimating Economic and Social Stress--and the Potential for Political Instability With It?: A Note." (2022)
"How Does Japan's Economic Performance Look When We Take into Account its Shrinking Working-Age Population?" (2022)
"Rising Complexity, Diminishing Returns, Shrinking Slack: Revisiting the Evidence." (2018)
"The Special Conditions of the Post-War Economic Boom: A Note." (2022)
"U.S. Defense Expenditure and Gross World Product in the Post-World War II Era: A Note." (2022)
"What if the Post-War Boom Had Simply Continued?: Notes on an Economic Counterfactual." (2022)
Saturday, March 16, 2024
The "Information Age"
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of "the information age" as previously discussed by its theorists, and the (very different) reality in which we actually live.
"The 'Information Age' Narrative and the Deflection of the Declinist Critique: A Note on the Tech Boom of the 1990s and Its Impact on American Politics." (2023)
"The Information Age Promise of Dematerialization: A Note." (2024)
"The Mood of America in the 1990s: A Note on the American Political Imagination After the Cold War." (2024)
"The Unipolar Moment and the Inflated Technological Expectations of the 1990s: A Note." (2022)
"'The 1990s Are Over': A Note on the Decline of Neoliberalism and the End of Unipolarity." (2022)
"The False Dawn of Information Age Warfare and the Industrial Reality of the Twenty-First Century: A Note." (2024)
"Cyber-Utopianism and Reality: A Note on the Politics of the Internet." (2024)
"To What Extent Was the Left Ever Actually 'Cyber-Utopian?': A Note." (2024)
"The Ascent of the Internet and the Ascent of the Culture War in American Political Life: A Note." (2024)
"Is a Flight into Virtuality Already Underway? A Consideration of Changing Lifeways in the Early Twenty-First Century." (2021)
"The 'Information Age' Narrative and the Deflection of the Declinist Critique: A Note on the Tech Boom of the 1990s and Its Impact on American Politics." (2023)
"The Information Age Promise of Dematerialization: A Note." (2024)
"The Mood of America in the 1990s: A Note on the American Political Imagination After the Cold War." (2024)
"The Unipolar Moment and the Inflated Technological Expectations of the 1990s: A Note." (2022)
"'The 1990s Are Over': A Note on the Decline of Neoliberalism and the End of Unipolarity." (2022)
"The False Dawn of Information Age Warfare and the Industrial Reality of the Twenty-First Century: A Note." (2024)
"Cyber-Utopianism and Reality: A Note on the Politics of the Internet." (2024)
"To What Extent Was the Left Ever Actually 'Cyber-Utopian?': A Note." (2024)
"The Ascent of the Internet and the Ascent of the Culture War in American Political Life: A Note." (2024)
"Is a Flight into Virtuality Already Underway? A Consideration of Changing Lifeways in the Early Twenty-First Century." (2021)
The "Middle Class"
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of what is so commonly called "the middle class." Central to the concern of this line of research has been the ambiguity of the term as commonly used--and the effort to offer a more meaningful standard as a basis for discussing just how extensive that class may have been in the past, and what has become of it since the mid-twentieth century.
The Definition of Middle Classness
"'What Qualifies a Household's Living Standard as Middle Class?' A Note." (2021)
"Of the Middle Class and the Quasi-Middle Class: A Note." (2023)
"Public Poverty and the Middle Class Living Standard: A Note." (2021)
The Decline of the Middle Class
"The Remaking--and Decline--of the Middle Class: A Note." (2021)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Ambiguities of the Middle Class' Fortunes Between the Mid-Twentieth Century and Today: A Note." (2023)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and Quasi-Middle Classness: A Note." (2023)
"U.S. Average and Median Hourly Compensation and Per Capita Gross Domestic Product: The Trend of the Last Half Century." (2022)
"The Declining Economic Viability of the Single-Income Household: A Note on the Fortunes of the Middle Class." (2022)
"The Four Year College Degree and the Middle Class Living Standard: A Tenuous Relationship." (2022)
"Natality, Senescence and the Quasi-Middle Class in the Neoliberal Era: A Note." (2023)
"The American Middle Class in the Twenty-First Century: Four Theses." (2022)
The Definition of Middle Classness
"'What Qualifies a Household's Living Standard as Middle Class?' A Note." (2021)
"Of the Middle Class and the Quasi-Middle Class: A Note." (2023)
"Public Poverty and the Middle Class Living Standard: A Note." (2021)
The Decline of the Middle Class
"The Remaking--and Decline--of the Middle Class: A Note." (2021)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Ambiguities of the Middle Class' Fortunes Between the Mid-Twentieth Century and Today: A Note." (2023)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and Quasi-Middle Classness: A Note." (2023)
"U.S. Average and Median Hourly Compensation and Per Capita Gross Domestic Product: The Trend of the Last Half Century." (2022)
"The Declining Economic Viability of the Single-Income Household: A Note on the Fortunes of the Middle Class." (2022)
"The Four Year College Degree and the Middle Class Living Standard: A Tenuous Relationship." (2022)
"Natality, Senescence and the Quasi-Middle Class in the Neoliberal Era: A Note." (2023)
"The American Middle Class in the Twenty-First Century: Four Theses." (2022)
Neoliberalism
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of neoliberalism. These papers cover such matters as the arguments over the definition of the term; neoliberalism as a distinct economic model; and the policy record of particular governments which have been strongly identified with neoliberalism.
Defining Neoliberalism
"'What is Neoliberalism? And What Has it Meant?': A Primer." (2021)
"What We Talk About When We Talk About Neoliberalism: Three Dimensions of the Issue." (2022)
"Daniel Rodgers' Critique of the Term 'Neoliberalism': A Note." (2023)
The Policy (and Rhetorical) Record of Governments and Politicians
"Was the Clinton Administration Neoliberal?" (2018)
"Neoliberalism in a Time of Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Defining Policies of the Obama Administration." (2019)
"'Was Tony Blair's Prime Ministership Neoliberal?': A Survey of British Economic Policy, 1979-2007." (2020)
"'Is Keir Starmer a Neoliberal?': A Note on Keir Starmer's Political Rhetoric." (2021)
Neoliberalism as Economic Model
"Keynesian Fordism and Neoliberal Financialization: A Comparison of Economic Models." (2020)
"Keynesian Fordism and Neoliberal Financialization: A Comparison of Economic Models (A Follow-Up Note on Rent-Seeking)." (2023)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Restructuring of the Economy: A Survey of the Data." (2022)
"'Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Restructuring of the Economy': A Follow-Up Note on the Question of Profit." (2022)
"Understanding the Endurance of Large States in the Neoliberal Era: Six Theses." (2021)
"Keynesian Fordism's Limits, Aftermath and Legacy: A Note." (2024)
Neoliberalism and Politics
"Keynesian Fordism and Neoliberal Financialization: A Note on the Transition Between Eras." (2021)
"American Neoliberalism: A Note on its Evolving Rationales and the Actualities of its Record." (2023)
"Neoliberalism as a Utopian Project of the Right: A Note." (2023)
"Were the Neoliberals 'Neoliberals' After All? A Note on Charles Peters' 'A Neoliberal's Manifesto.'" (2023)
"Centrists' Stance Toward Neoliberalism's Critics: A Note." (2022)
"Neoliberalism, British Identity, and Brexit." (2020)
"Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism and the Remaking of British Identity." (2022)
"Ecological Catastrophe and the Neoliberal Imagination." (2020)
"Of Singularitarianism and Flying Cars: Our Changing Images of the Future, and Our Changing Economic Models." (2020)
Economic Growth Under Neoliberalism
"The Neoliberal Record: Growth: A Second Look." (2020)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Restructuring of the Economy: A Survey of the Data." (2022)
"Investments in Societal Complexity, Diminishing Marginal Returns and Neoliberalism: A Note." (2020)
The Decline of Neoliberalism?
"'The 1990s Are Over': A Note on the Decline of Neoliberalism and the End of Unipolarity." (2022)
"The Decline of Neoliberalism? A Critical View." (2022)
"The 'Decline' of Neoliberalism as Against the 'End' of Neoliberalism: A Note." (2023)
Neoliberalism and the Middle Class
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Ambiguities of the Middle Class' Fortunes Between the Mid-Twentieth Century and Today: A Note." (2023)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and Quasi-Middle Classness: A Note." (2023)
"Natality, Senescence and the Quasi-Middle Class in the Neoliberal Era: A Note." (2023)
Other Papers on Neoliberalism
"What We Talk About When We Talk About Neoliberalism: Three Dimensions of the Issue." (2022)
"Cryptocurrency as Symbol of the Neoliberal Era: A Note." (2023)
Defining Neoliberalism
"'What is Neoliberalism? And What Has it Meant?': A Primer." (2021)
"What We Talk About When We Talk About Neoliberalism: Three Dimensions of the Issue." (2022)
"Daniel Rodgers' Critique of the Term 'Neoliberalism': A Note." (2023)
The Policy (and Rhetorical) Record of Governments and Politicians
"Was the Clinton Administration Neoliberal?" (2018)
"Neoliberalism in a Time of Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Defining Policies of the Obama Administration." (2019)
"'Was Tony Blair's Prime Ministership Neoliberal?': A Survey of British Economic Policy, 1979-2007." (2020)
"'Is Keir Starmer a Neoliberal?': A Note on Keir Starmer's Political Rhetoric." (2021)
Neoliberalism as Economic Model
"Keynesian Fordism and Neoliberal Financialization: A Comparison of Economic Models." (2020)
"Keynesian Fordism and Neoliberal Financialization: A Comparison of Economic Models (A Follow-Up Note on Rent-Seeking)." (2023)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Restructuring of the Economy: A Survey of the Data." (2022)
"'Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Restructuring of the Economy': A Follow-Up Note on the Question of Profit." (2022)
"Understanding the Endurance of Large States in the Neoliberal Era: Six Theses." (2021)
"Keynesian Fordism's Limits, Aftermath and Legacy: A Note." (2024)
Neoliberalism and Politics
"Keynesian Fordism and Neoliberal Financialization: A Note on the Transition Between Eras." (2021)
"American Neoliberalism: A Note on its Evolving Rationales and the Actualities of its Record." (2023)
"Neoliberalism as a Utopian Project of the Right: A Note." (2023)
"Were the Neoliberals 'Neoliberals' After All? A Note on Charles Peters' 'A Neoliberal's Manifesto.'" (2023)
"Centrists' Stance Toward Neoliberalism's Critics: A Note." (2022)
"Neoliberalism, British Identity, and Brexit." (2020)
"Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism and the Remaking of British Identity." (2022)
"Ecological Catastrophe and the Neoliberal Imagination." (2020)
"Of Singularitarianism and Flying Cars: Our Changing Images of the Future, and Our Changing Economic Models." (2020)
Economic Growth Under Neoliberalism
"The Neoliberal Record: Growth: A Second Look." (2020)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Restructuring of the Economy: A Survey of the Data." (2022)
"Investments in Societal Complexity, Diminishing Marginal Returns and Neoliberalism: A Note." (2020)
The Decline of Neoliberalism?
"'The 1990s Are Over': A Note on the Decline of Neoliberalism and the End of Unipolarity." (2022)
"The Decline of Neoliberalism? A Critical View." (2022)
"The 'Decline' of Neoliberalism as Against the 'End' of Neoliberalism: A Note." (2023)
Neoliberalism and the Middle Class
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and the Ambiguities of the Middle Class' Fortunes Between the Mid-Twentieth Century and Today: A Note." (2023)
"Keynesian Fordism, Neoliberal Financialization and Quasi-Middle Classness: A Note." (2023)
"Natality, Senescence and the Quasi-Middle Class in the Neoliberal Era: A Note." (2023)
Other Papers on Neoliberalism
"What We Talk About When We Talk About Neoliberalism: Three Dimensions of the Issue." (2022)
"Cryptocurrency as Symbol of the Neoliberal Era: A Note." (2023)
The 1990s
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of the 1990s, focusing on its politics--in cases, as reflected in its popular culture.
"The Mood of America in the 1990s: A Note on the American Political Imagination After the Cold War." (2024)
"U.S. Gross World Product Share in the 1990s and The Anticipations of a Unipolar Era." (2022)
"The Unipolar Moment and the Inflated Technological Expectations of the 1990s: A Note." (2022)
"The 'Information Age' Narrative and the Deflection of the Declinist Critique: A Note on the Tech Boom of the 1990s and Its Impact on American Politics." (2023)
"Thomas Frank's 'Market Populism': Is it Still Relevant?" (2022)
"'The 1990s Are Over': A Note on the Decline of Neoliberalism and the End of Unipolarity." (2022)
"What Made the '90s so 'Extreme?' A Note on the 'Extreme' Aesthetic of the Decade." (2024)
"Revisiting the 'Extreme' Culture of the 1990s: A Fuller Consideration." (2023)
"The Decline of the Spy Story and the Transformation of the Thriller in the 1990s: The Data From the Bestseller List." (2018)
"The American Military Techno-Thriller and the Debate Over Women in Combat of the 1990s." (2024)
"Reliving the 1940s in the 1990s: Germany and Japan in the Military Techno-Thriller." (2024)
"The Mood of America in the 1990s: A Note on the American Political Imagination After the Cold War." (2024)
"U.S. Gross World Product Share in the 1990s and The Anticipations of a Unipolar Era." (2022)
"The Unipolar Moment and the Inflated Technological Expectations of the 1990s: A Note." (2022)
"The 'Information Age' Narrative and the Deflection of the Declinist Critique: A Note on the Tech Boom of the 1990s and Its Impact on American Politics." (2023)
"Thomas Frank's 'Market Populism': Is it Still Relevant?" (2022)
"'The 1990s Are Over': A Note on the Decline of Neoliberalism and the End of Unipolarity." (2022)
"What Made the '90s so 'Extreme?' A Note on the 'Extreme' Aesthetic of the Decade." (2024)
"Revisiting the 'Extreme' Culture of the 1990s: A Fuller Consideration." (2023)
"The Decline of the Spy Story and the Transformation of the Thriller in the 1990s: The Data From the Bestseller List." (2018)
"The American Military Techno-Thriller and the Debate Over Women in Combat of the 1990s." (2024)
"Reliving the 1940s in the 1990s: Germany and Japan in the Military Techno-Thriller." (2024)
Political Centrism
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of political centrism. These papers define the term; situate centrism within the history of political philosophy and the political spectrum, especially as perceived in America (specifically explaining centrism as an adaptation of classical conservatism to mid-twentieth century Cold War America); and proceeds to discuss a number of smaller aspects of the phenomenon, particularly the connections between centrism and the culture of the professional groups, centrism's bounding of the legitimate spectrum of political discourse, and centrism's influence on the conduct of the mainstream of the American media.
Centrism: What it is and is Not
"American Centrism: Five Theses." (2022)
"'What is Centrism?': An Examination of Centrism as a Conservative Political Philosophy." (2021)
"'What is Centrism?': A Follow-Up." (2022)
"The Centrist Electoral Promise of a More Competent Conservatism: A Note." (2023)
"Classical Conservatism, Centrism and the Emotional Appeal of Ideology." (2024)
Centrism in Relation to Other Ideologies and Tendencies
"On the Confusion of Centrism with Liberalism: A Note." (2023)
"The Confusion of the Political Center with the Left: A Note on Some of the Implications." (2023)
"Pseudo-Conservatives, Pseudo-Liberals, the Pseudo-Left and the Incoherence of American Political Discourse." (2023)
"Centrism and the Legitimate Bounds of Political Discourse: A Note." (2023)
"Centrism and Populism: A Note." (2022)
"Revisiting Richard Hofstadter's 'Pseudo-Conservatism.'" (2023)
"What is Fascism? The View From Left, Center and Right: A Note." (2022)
"Centrists' Stance Toward Neoliberalism's Critics: A Note." (2022)
Centrism and the Professional Occupational Groups
"Centrism and the Politics of Expertise in American Discourse: A Note." (2023)
"The Professional Outlook and Political Centrism: A Note." (2023)
Centrism and the Media
"Toward a Fuller Understanding of Media Bias: The Role of Centrist Ideology." (2022)
"Toward a Theory of Media 'Both Sidesism': A Note." (2024)
Centrism Outside the United States
"Centrism, The Labour Party and Keir Starmer in 2023: A Note." (2023)
Centrism: What it is and is Not
"American Centrism: Five Theses." (2022)
"'What is Centrism?': An Examination of Centrism as a Conservative Political Philosophy." (2021)
"'What is Centrism?': A Follow-Up." (2022)
"The Centrist Electoral Promise of a More Competent Conservatism: A Note." (2023)
"Classical Conservatism, Centrism and the Emotional Appeal of Ideology." (2024)
Centrism in Relation to Other Ideologies and Tendencies
"On the Confusion of Centrism with Liberalism: A Note." (2023)
"The Confusion of the Political Center with the Left: A Note on Some of the Implications." (2023)
"Pseudo-Conservatives, Pseudo-Liberals, the Pseudo-Left and the Incoherence of American Political Discourse." (2023)
"Centrism and the Legitimate Bounds of Political Discourse: A Note." (2023)
"Centrism and Populism: A Note." (2022)
"Revisiting Richard Hofstadter's 'Pseudo-Conservatism.'" (2023)
"What is Fascism? The View From Left, Center and Right: A Note." (2022)
"Centrists' Stance Toward Neoliberalism's Critics: A Note." (2022)
Centrism and the Professional Occupational Groups
"Centrism and the Politics of Expertise in American Discourse: A Note." (2023)
"The Professional Outlook and Political Centrism: A Note." (2023)
Centrism and the Media
"Toward a Fuller Understanding of Media Bias: The Role of Centrist Ideology." (2022)
"Toward a Theory of Media 'Both Sidesism': A Note." (2024)
Centrism Outside the United States
"Centrism, The Labour Party and Keir Starmer in 2023: A Note." (2023)
The Politics of the Media
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of the politics of the American media, with a focus on the news media, and especially the influence of centrist political ideology here.
News Media
"Toward a Fuller Understanding of Media Bias: The Role of Centrist Ideology." (2022)
"Toward a Theory of Media 'Both Sidesism': A Note." (2024)
"Centrism and the Politics of Expertise in American Discourse: A Note." (2023)
"What It Means for the News Business to Be a Business—And Journalism a Profession: A Note." (2022)
Popular Culture
"Liberal Hollywood? A Note on the Conventional Wisdom." (2022)
"Why Does Discussion of Pop Culture Make Up So Large a Part of Political Discourse in Twenty-First Century America?" (2022)
Politics of the Internet
"Cyber-Utopianism and Reality: A Note on the Politics of the Internet." (2024)
"To What Extent Was the Left Ever Actually 'Cyber-Utopian?': A Note." (2024)
"The Ascent of the Internet and the Ascent of the Culture War in American Political Life: A Note." (2024)
News Media
"Toward a Fuller Understanding of Media Bias: The Role of Centrist Ideology." (2022)
"Toward a Theory of Media 'Both Sidesism': A Note." (2024)
"Centrism and the Politics of Expertise in American Discourse: A Note." (2023)
"What It Means for the News Business to Be a Business—And Journalism a Profession: A Note." (2022)
Popular Culture
"Liberal Hollywood? A Note on the Conventional Wisdom." (2022)
"Why Does Discussion of Pop Culture Make Up So Large a Part of Political Discourse in Twenty-First Century America?" (2022)
Politics of the Internet
"Cyber-Utopianism and Reality: A Note on the Politics of the Internet." (2024)
"To What Extent Was the Left Ever Actually 'Cyber-Utopian?': A Note." (2024)
"The Ascent of the Internet and the Ascent of the Culture War in American Political Life: A Note." (2024)
"The Unipolar Moment"
This page lists my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) working papers addressing the subject of the "unipolar moment" of the 1990s--the rationale behind it, the expectations of its long endurance, the contrast between those expectations and the reality with which analysts are now grappling.
"The Mood of America in the 1990s: A Note on the American Political Imagination After the Cold War." (2024)
"U.S. Gross World Product Share in the 1990s and The Anticipations of a Unipolar Era." (2022)
"The Unipolar Moment and the Inflated Technological Expectations of the 1990s: A Note." (2022)
"The 'Information Age' Narrative and the Deflection of the Declinist Critique: A Note on the Tech Boom of the 1990s and Its Impact on American Politics." (2023)
"'The 1990s Are Over': A Note on the Decline of Neoliberalism and the End of Unipolarity." (2022)
"Economic Boom Without End: Visions of Unipolarity and the Shock of the Twenty-First Century." (2022)
"The Waning of Unipolarity in the Military Sphere: A Note." (2022)
"The End of the Unipolar Moment: Revisiting the Issue in the Wake of the Russo-Ukrainian War." (2022)
"What Do We Mean By Unipolarity? A Note on China's Place in the International System." (2024)
"The Mood of America in the 1990s: A Note on the American Political Imagination After the Cold War." (2024)
"U.S. Gross World Product Share in the 1990s and The Anticipations of a Unipolar Era." (2022)
"The Unipolar Moment and the Inflated Technological Expectations of the 1990s: A Note." (2022)
"The 'Information Age' Narrative and the Deflection of the Declinist Critique: A Note on the Tech Boom of the 1990s and Its Impact on American Politics." (2023)
"'The 1990s Are Over': A Note on the Decline of Neoliberalism and the End of Unipolarity." (2022)
"Economic Boom Without End: Visions of Unipolarity and the Shock of the Twenty-First Century." (2022)
"The Waning of Unipolarity in the Military Sphere: A Note." (2022)
"The End of the Unipolar Moment: Revisiting the Issue in the Wake of the Russo-Ukrainian War." (2022)
"What Do We Mean By Unipolarity? A Note on China's Place in the International System." (2024)
Sunday, February 25, 2024
The Rudimentary Lathe and World Manufacturing Supremacy
What do lathes have to do with world manufacturing supremacy?
A lot, actually.
First, let us get out of the way what a lathe actually is. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a lathe is "a machine in which work is rotated about a horizontal axis and shaped by a fixed tool."
It is thus an example of what are called "machine tools," which cut, grind or otherwise shape metal and other materials.
This may sound like a very simple and humble piece of equipment, but that simplicity is both what makes it important--and very deceptive. That it is so basic a device (lathes have been used for thousands of years) is what makes it indispensable to industrial life, machine tools the machines that we use to make everything else.
At the same time, far from their production being like, for example, textile production, in its easy transfer to developing nations with little capital and lots of cheap labor, their production tends to be the purview of the most advanced industrial powers.
Why? Simply put, making the machines that make everything else is a very exacting business. And it is the needs of those doing the most manufacturing, and the most exacting manufacturing, that drive the industry. They are thus great consumers of the tools--and given that no one has their capacity to provide the supply (and that location still matters in the economic world we live in) great producers of them as well, such that for all their consumption of the tools they are typically also great net exporters of them. In fact, a country's machine tool consumption, production, export, is a good index of where it stands within world manufacturing generally--especially when we look to the "per capita" figures that make allowances for the difference in size between a Singapore on the one hand, and a China on the other.
Consider, for example, the contents of the Gardner 2016 Machine Tool Survey. According to that document in 2015 the six largest net exporters of the tools were, by order of ranking, Japan, Germany, Taiwan, Italy, Switzerland and South Korea. Where per capita consumption was concerned the top three were Switzerland, Germany, South Korea, with Singapore, Taiwan and Italy in the top ten, and Japan at #11.
A rising profile here is indicative of progress--with China, if still a net importer, an increasingly important producer, manufacturing almost as much of the tools as Japan and Germany put together to make the #1 spot in that year, while ranking #4 among exporters.
Equally a declining profile is indicative of, well, things going the other way. As late as the 1980s the U.S., a longtime champion here, was, in spite of some fairly deep problems, still the world's largest producer of such tools. By the 1990s it had slipped to the #4 position--behind Germany, Japan and Italy. By 2015 it had slipped behind China and South Korea as well. It was down to #8 on the list of exporters (behind Switzerland and Taiwan too), and running a big trade deficit in this area--even as its per capita consumption was not very high. Against Switzerland's $127 per capita consumption of the tools, and the figures of $79 for Germany, $76 for South Korea, $51 for Italy and $46 for Japan the U.S. figure was just $23--which put it just a little way ahead of developing China ($20), Mexico ($17), Thailand ($17).
Compared against the broader picture of U.S. industry over these decades it seems all too telling--the figures I calculated from the data showing American manufacturing value added growth, slowing in the late 1960s and 1970s, really stagnating in the 1980s and 1990s, and pretty much flatlining in the twenty-first century, as its makeup changed profoundly. The output of the heavy and Fordist type of industry long the foundation of U.S. industrial strength actually shrank after 1978--the output of metal and electrical goods and motor vehicles and machinery, which ought to have grown in a supposedly growing economy (and a country whose population expanded by 50 percent), instead falling by a quarter. What filled the gap was not really high-tech production (U.S. output of computer and electronics products peaked back around the turn of the century, then fell hard after), but a more basic processing of raw materials--the main areas of expansion in output petroleum and coal products, and the related field of chemicals, with all this reflected in the export profile. (World Bank figures actually have the percentage of "high-tech" in U.S. manufacturing exports falling from 30 percent in 2007 to 18 percent in 2022.)
The country's going from its earlier standing as a producer of classic heavy-Fordist manufacturing durables (and computer products!) to a producer of more oil and more chemicals is a far cry from the smug promises of "information age" propagandists who blew off the shutdown of so many of the country's steel mills and auto plants as merely the decline of "sunset" industries as rising new high-tech sectors replaced them. But that is what has happened in reality--as that changing profile of the country's consumption, production and trade in machine tools testifies.
Indeed, the web site of Summit Machine Tools sums it up nicely, explaining that "a map of modern lathe makers mirrors a map of global heavy industry," for "rudimentary" as a particular lathe may be, modern lathe-making is anything but--while regrettably, "the heyday of American-made lathes . . . passed" as part of the passing of much else.
A lot, actually.
First, let us get out of the way what a lathe actually is. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a lathe is "a machine in which work is rotated about a horizontal axis and shaped by a fixed tool."
It is thus an example of what are called "machine tools," which cut, grind or otherwise shape metal and other materials.
This may sound like a very simple and humble piece of equipment, but that simplicity is both what makes it important--and very deceptive. That it is so basic a device (lathes have been used for thousands of years) is what makes it indispensable to industrial life, machine tools the machines that we use to make everything else.
At the same time, far from their production being like, for example, textile production, in its easy transfer to developing nations with little capital and lots of cheap labor, their production tends to be the purview of the most advanced industrial powers.
Why? Simply put, making the machines that make everything else is a very exacting business. And it is the needs of those doing the most manufacturing, and the most exacting manufacturing, that drive the industry. They are thus great consumers of the tools--and given that no one has their capacity to provide the supply (and that location still matters in the economic world we live in) great producers of them as well, such that for all their consumption of the tools they are typically also great net exporters of them. In fact, a country's machine tool consumption, production, export, is a good index of where it stands within world manufacturing generally--especially when we look to the "per capita" figures that make allowances for the difference in size between a Singapore on the one hand, and a China on the other.
Consider, for example, the contents of the Gardner 2016 Machine Tool Survey. According to that document in 2015 the six largest net exporters of the tools were, by order of ranking, Japan, Germany, Taiwan, Italy, Switzerland and South Korea. Where per capita consumption was concerned the top three were Switzerland, Germany, South Korea, with Singapore, Taiwan and Italy in the top ten, and Japan at #11.
A rising profile here is indicative of progress--with China, if still a net importer, an increasingly important producer, manufacturing almost as much of the tools as Japan and Germany put together to make the #1 spot in that year, while ranking #4 among exporters.
Equally a declining profile is indicative of, well, things going the other way. As late as the 1980s the U.S., a longtime champion here, was, in spite of some fairly deep problems, still the world's largest producer of such tools. By the 1990s it had slipped to the #4 position--behind Germany, Japan and Italy. By 2015 it had slipped behind China and South Korea as well. It was down to #8 on the list of exporters (behind Switzerland and Taiwan too), and running a big trade deficit in this area--even as its per capita consumption was not very high. Against Switzerland's $127 per capita consumption of the tools, and the figures of $79 for Germany, $76 for South Korea, $51 for Italy and $46 for Japan the U.S. figure was just $23--which put it just a little way ahead of developing China ($20), Mexico ($17), Thailand ($17).
Compared against the broader picture of U.S. industry over these decades it seems all too telling--the figures I calculated from the data showing American manufacturing value added growth, slowing in the late 1960s and 1970s, really stagnating in the 1980s and 1990s, and pretty much flatlining in the twenty-first century, as its makeup changed profoundly. The output of the heavy and Fordist type of industry long the foundation of U.S. industrial strength actually shrank after 1978--the output of metal and electrical goods and motor vehicles and machinery, which ought to have grown in a supposedly growing economy (and a country whose population expanded by 50 percent), instead falling by a quarter. What filled the gap was not really high-tech production (U.S. output of computer and electronics products peaked back around the turn of the century, then fell hard after), but a more basic processing of raw materials--the main areas of expansion in output petroleum and coal products, and the related field of chemicals, with all this reflected in the export profile. (World Bank figures actually have the percentage of "high-tech" in U.S. manufacturing exports falling from 30 percent in 2007 to 18 percent in 2022.)
The country's going from its earlier standing as a producer of classic heavy-Fordist manufacturing durables (and computer products!) to a producer of more oil and more chemicals is a far cry from the smug promises of "information age" propagandists who blew off the shutdown of so many of the country's steel mills and auto plants as merely the decline of "sunset" industries as rising new high-tech sectors replaced them. But that is what has happened in reality--as that changing profile of the country's consumption, production and trade in machine tools testifies.
Indeed, the web site of Summit Machine Tools sums it up nicely, explaining that "a map of modern lathe makers mirrors a map of global heavy industry," for "rudimentary" as a particular lathe may be, modern lathe-making is anything but--while regrettably, "the heyday of American-made lathes . . . passed" as part of the passing of much else.
The Sixth-Generation Fighter: How Does its Progress Stand in 2024?
Every now and then I turn my attention back to the matter of the sixth-generation fighter I first took up in 2010. Back then all I could reasonably discuss was background (explaining the system of "generations"), the desiderata that were being discussed for the next generation of fighters (hypersonic and near space-flying, AI-piloted, intercontinental-range aircraft that change shape in flight and blast the enemy with directed-energy weapons), and my thoughts as to the likelihood of such aircraft being realized in anything like the time frame being discussed.
At the time I expected that the twenty-first century would be an era of slow technological progress (certainly in the more relevant areas), making the Wunderwaffen of which the sixth-generation theorists dreamed implausible, while contributing to the slow economic growth that was going to make such aircraft unaffordable even were they to prove technically feasible. (Think fighters costing a billion dollars or more each in a time of unending austerity.) I also thought such aircraft, even if feasible and affordable, as likely to be remote from the actual needs of the major militaries in an era of muted great power conflict and "small wars."
Revisiting the issue a few years ago it seemed to me that I had been right--mostly. It has indeed been an era of slow technological progress, and weak economic growth, such that the wonder-planes people talked about circa 2010 simply were not going to happen by 2030--let alone prove affordable in any meaningful quantity. But great power conflict resurged in a big way, and in the process led to intensified interest internationally in a new generation of combat aircraft.
So where did that leave things? Between the desire for new aircraft--and the fact of slow technical progress and strained means--it seemed that there was a considerable lowering of the bar where expectations of the new aircraft were concerned. Rather than, for example, hypersonic jets they were thinking Mach 2 aircraft (with the same top speed fighters have had since the 1950s) which merely launch hypersonic missiles.
One of the more interesting developments was a turn by the U.S. Air Force back to the approach it took with its second-generation fighters--the famed "Century" series where it pursued a rapid development of a next-generation fighter it bought in some quantity, followed by another, more advanced fighter it bought in its turn using the lessons learned from the last, and so on (going from the F-100 Super Sabre to the F-106 Delta Dart in not much more than a half decade), in contrast with its later approaches (the long development, production, employment of the third-generation F-4, fourth-generation F-15 and F-16, and so on).
The reuse of the strategy pursued in the development of the second-generation planes had many critics from the start, put off by the poor image many of its aircraft have had, while being unconvinced by the buzzword-heavy arguments made for advances in digital design techniques permitting the rapid design of aircraft to be procured in small batches to be cost-effective. Still, for all the misgivings some had, it did seem the program was going ahead, the more in as in late 2020 the public was told that an actual sixth-generation jet had flown (even if no source I know of reported any more than that).
Since then, however, the Air Force seems to have shifted back toward its more conventional acquisitions process--but otherwise things remain as they appeared in 2020, no fundamental breakthrough suggesting the imminent appearance of those super-fighters that had people talking in 2010, or for that matter, any great public disclosure making it much clearer what the next-generation jet really will look like when all is said and done.
At the time I expected that the twenty-first century would be an era of slow technological progress (certainly in the more relevant areas), making the Wunderwaffen of which the sixth-generation theorists dreamed implausible, while contributing to the slow economic growth that was going to make such aircraft unaffordable even were they to prove technically feasible. (Think fighters costing a billion dollars or more each in a time of unending austerity.) I also thought such aircraft, even if feasible and affordable, as likely to be remote from the actual needs of the major militaries in an era of muted great power conflict and "small wars."
Revisiting the issue a few years ago it seemed to me that I had been right--mostly. It has indeed been an era of slow technological progress, and weak economic growth, such that the wonder-planes people talked about circa 2010 simply were not going to happen by 2030--let alone prove affordable in any meaningful quantity. But great power conflict resurged in a big way, and in the process led to intensified interest internationally in a new generation of combat aircraft.
So where did that leave things? Between the desire for new aircraft--and the fact of slow technical progress and strained means--it seemed that there was a considerable lowering of the bar where expectations of the new aircraft were concerned. Rather than, for example, hypersonic jets they were thinking Mach 2 aircraft (with the same top speed fighters have had since the 1950s) which merely launch hypersonic missiles.
One of the more interesting developments was a turn by the U.S. Air Force back to the approach it took with its second-generation fighters--the famed "Century" series where it pursued a rapid development of a next-generation fighter it bought in some quantity, followed by another, more advanced fighter it bought in its turn using the lessons learned from the last, and so on (going from the F-100 Super Sabre to the F-106 Delta Dart in not much more than a half decade), in contrast with its later approaches (the long development, production, employment of the third-generation F-4, fourth-generation F-15 and F-16, and so on).
The reuse of the strategy pursued in the development of the second-generation planes had many critics from the start, put off by the poor image many of its aircraft have had, while being unconvinced by the buzzword-heavy arguments made for advances in digital design techniques permitting the rapid design of aircraft to be procured in small batches to be cost-effective. Still, for all the misgivings some had, it did seem the program was going ahead, the more in as in late 2020 the public was told that an actual sixth-generation jet had flown (even if no source I know of reported any more than that).
Since then, however, the Air Force seems to have shifted back toward its more conventional acquisitions process--but otherwise things remain as they appeared in 2020, no fundamental breakthrough suggesting the imminent appearance of those super-fighters that had people talking in 2010, or for that matter, any great public disclosure making it much clearer what the next-generation jet really will look like when all is said and done.
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