For orthodox economists it has been bad enough that neoliberalism has had as its product not only social misery but developmental failure. Making things worse is that a nation should enjoy so much success for so long a time by way of rejecting neoliberal prescriptions, instead following a statist and mercantilist course of development that has stressed exactly the "hard" industries that finance-singing neoliberals are so prone to treat with disdain (along with those who stand up for them). That the government presiding over the progress has been run by a party still calling itself Communist (however little its actual policies may have to do with Communism), that international relations have become more hostile (indeed, even that China has become such a large producer of "green" technology of the kind the fossil fuel-worshipping right despises, such that one does not hear the right screaming against the recent tariffs on such goods in the name of their free-market pieties), has only lent a further edge to their hostility to China's gains. The result has been their endlessly predicting doom for China's growth, and even the outright collapse of the Chinese state--only to see China defying those predictions for decade after decade. Even the Great Recession, escalating trade war with the United States and its allies, and the COVID-19 pandemic, this remains the case, China's growth admittedly slowing, but still greatly superior to what the rest of the world has seen for the most part, with China's 4.7 percent a year average annual GDP growth rate in the crisis years of 2020-2023 enviable (certainly next to the U.S.' mere 2 percent, Europe's 1.1 percent, Japan's 0.3 percent over the same time frame)--and even the slowing seeming to bespeak not the failure but the maturity of an economy that by this point would seem to have surmounted any "middle income trap" to go by its high-technology exports (greater than those of the whole G-7 in the aggregate, and greater than those of the U.S. today in per capita terms).
Of course, none of this has given the doomsayers any pause, the predictions still forthcoming.
Such analysts' ceaseless doomsaying about China has had its complement in their comparative optimism about the prospects of India--which they view so much more positively because in contrast with the statist-mercantilist, manufacturing-minded Chinese model India presents a more thoroughly privatized-neoliberal, services-oriented, financialized economy of the sort they approve and champion, with India's undeniable explosion in inequality part of what they find a very welcome package. (If the term "billionaire Raj" is in many utterances a criticism of the combination of extreme wealth in a few hands with vast poverty, for such economic thinkers the country's generation of billion-dollar fortunes are India's glory.) That India is governed by a far right political party, and is seen as at least potentially a counterbalance to China (a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but also a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), only makes them more favorably disposed toward the country and the prospects of its economy.
Of course, none of this in itself means that China will not find its development stalling out, or that India will not eventually overtake China's progress (even if in the most bullish scenario this is apt to be later rather than sooner given China's very, very long lead with a GDP more than five times as big as India's, and a manufacturing value added more than ten times India's, to go by the United Nations numbers). What it does mean is that anyone taking an interest in that conversation ignores those very powerful, enduring, prejudices at their peril and should look the more closely at the specifics that analysts offer in support of their claims, rather than relying on their supposed "authoritative judgment" as "experts" in the way that the mainstream media ceaselessly encourages us to do--and pay particular attention to those who refuse to conform to the prevailing "consensus." A good example of this is Michael Roberts, a longtime City of London economist who has not towed the line, least of all on China and India--and, right or wrong, given us a good deal more to think about than do the purveyors of "elitism mixed with banality" so beloved of those besotted with pompous phrases like "the adults in the room."
Tuesday, September 24, 2024
Emmanuel Todd's Writing About Natality
When Emmanuel Todd published his La Défaite de l'Occident (The Defeat of the West) rightist commentators in America were visibly delighted at the fact of a prominent French academic who had tended to be associated with the left presenting America as being in economic decline, and general decline as a leading power, due to the decline of the homogeneity of its elite, waning religiosity and a neglect of engineering-oriented education, and its championing of "non-traditional" ideas about family and gender internationally in a world for the most part little inclined to have anything to do with them. (Thus was it the case that, while it is far from the norm for major American newspapers to devote pieces to books not even available in English, figures like the Claremont Institute's Christopher Caldwell wrote about the book for the New York Times.) However, those writers seizing on Todd's authority in support of these positions were of course being very selective, overlooking much else that Todd had to say, not least about the subject of natality. In Todd's view fertility correlates inversely with neoliberalism--the prevailing version of capitalism depriving people with middle class standards with regard to "personal responsibility" in regard to marriage and family of the security that they would regard themselves as requiring before they have children, with neoliberal champion Korea's plunging fertility rate and neoliberalism-resistant France's relatively high rate both making the point in his view.
If any of those rightist commentators' approval of Todd's discussion of such matters as the decline of Protestantism translated over to an openness to his criticisms of neoliberalism, it has so far escaped me.
If any of those rightist commentators' approval of Todd's discussion of such matters as the decline of Protestantism translated over to an openness to his criticisms of neoliberalism, it has so far escaped me.
Just What is the Total Fertility Rate in the U.S. and What Does it Tell Us About American Life?
It seems that natality has become a fashionable topic in America--mostly because of the culture war-minded right, but then, the logic of centrism and the biases of the media being what they are, it is that right which sets the agenda in American discourse, its grievances the ones that get discussed.
Of course, as is usually the case with the dialogue about such matters we hear little of substance. Consider the reality of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR). As a quick check of the World Bank's data set regarding the matter shows, the U.S. TFR had its ups and downs in the past. After the post-World War II "baby boom" the TFR trended downward, and fell especially steeply after the early 1970s, striking 1.7 in 1976. There was a recovery, but it was only at the end of the 1980s that the rate returned to replacement level, where it stayed for the '90s and '00s before dropping again after 2008-2009.
The reader who knows anything of economic history has likely noticed a commonality between the slippage in the 1970s, and the slippage after 2008-2009, namely that in each case it correlates with a nasty and prolonged economic shock, the kind that makes responsible people put off having families and children precisely because they are not confident of being in a position to take care of them. Indeed, it is significant that America's TFR hit its low in 2020, dropping to 1.6 amid the addition of the post-pandemic disruption of American life to the stresses of the Great Recession that, contrary to the press' stupid propaganda, never really went away, and with it the added disinclination to make the commitments involved in having children (as, of course, an enormous amount of data demonstrates).
Still, if there have been ups and downs it does seem to me that there is more at issue than the merely cyclical character of economic life. The highly insecure neoliberal way of life that the economically orthodox think is so delightful is anything but for the vast majority of those actually living it, and it seems to me that Emmanuel Todd is entirely right when he argues for the inverse relationship between neoliberalism and natality. Alas, our media, which in its usual manner hastened to give platforms to the culture warriors as they selectively seized on Todd's work as affirmation of their ideas, has no interest in platforming anyone likely to take up those ideas of Todd's, or for that matter, any alertness to hard economic realities and what they actually mean for those we more mendaciously than ever call "middle class." Instead when it comes to topics like that, outfits like the Times give us Justin Wolfers telling us "Don't worry, be happy" in pieces that absolutely embody Thomas Frank's characterization of the American news media's "paramount problem" as its "annoying professional-class assumptions."
Of course, as is usually the case with the dialogue about such matters we hear little of substance. Consider the reality of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR). As a quick check of the World Bank's data set regarding the matter shows, the U.S. TFR had its ups and downs in the past. After the post-World War II "baby boom" the TFR trended downward, and fell especially steeply after the early 1970s, striking 1.7 in 1976. There was a recovery, but it was only at the end of the 1980s that the rate returned to replacement level, where it stayed for the '90s and '00s before dropping again after 2008-2009.
The reader who knows anything of economic history has likely noticed a commonality between the slippage in the 1970s, and the slippage after 2008-2009, namely that in each case it correlates with a nasty and prolonged economic shock, the kind that makes responsible people put off having families and children precisely because they are not confident of being in a position to take care of them. Indeed, it is significant that America's TFR hit its low in 2020, dropping to 1.6 amid the addition of the post-pandemic disruption of American life to the stresses of the Great Recession that, contrary to the press' stupid propaganda, never really went away, and with it the added disinclination to make the commitments involved in having children (as, of course, an enormous amount of data demonstrates).
Still, if there have been ups and downs it does seem to me that there is more at issue than the merely cyclical character of economic life. The highly insecure neoliberal way of life that the economically orthodox think is so delightful is anything but for the vast majority of those actually living it, and it seems to me that Emmanuel Todd is entirely right when he argues for the inverse relationship between neoliberalism and natality. Alas, our media, which in its usual manner hastened to give platforms to the culture warriors as they selectively seized on Todd's work as affirmation of their ideas, has no interest in platforming anyone likely to take up those ideas of Todd's, or for that matter, any alertness to hard economic realities and what they actually mean for those we more mendaciously than ever call "middle class." Instead when it comes to topics like that, outfits like the Times give us Justin Wolfers telling us "Don't worry, be happy" in pieces that absolutely embody Thomas Frank's characterization of the American news media's "paramount problem" as its "annoying professional-class assumptions."
Thursday, August 15, 2024
Book Review: The Profits of Religion: An Essay in Economic Interpretation, by Upton Sinclair
While it is the last of the books I have reviewed for this blog, The Profits of Religion (1917) was actually the first of the books of what became the "Dead Hand" series that Upton Sinclair published.
As the play on words that is the title of Sinclair's book makes clear, he regarded organized religion as a racket--and has been pretty much the same racket all over the world, since the dawn of recorded history. This has, of course, all been said over the years many, many times, but in an era in which it is generally the right that gets to have it say before a wide audience on this subject as on virtually all others so that the "New Atheists" dominate what passes for "rationalist" criticism of religion within the mainstream, Sinclair's coming at the matter of religion from a very different standpoint can by itself distinguish him from those other writers on the subject one is likely to encounter today. Beginning with a surreal and symbolic vision of a field of people trying to, literally, lift themselves up by their bootstraps toward the sky under the tutelage of priests, as the Wholesale Pickpockets Association takes advantage of their distraction to do what its name indicates to be the main activity of its members, Sinclair tells us explicitly in Profits that his "thesis is the effect of fixed dogma in producing mental paralysis, and the use of this mental paralysis by Economic Exploitation"--an effect he traces from the prehistoric past to the present day. That is to say, if prehistoric peoples' incapacity to tell the difference between reality, dream and fancy as they strove to explain the often perplexing and frightening world in which they lived gave an emergent priestly caste the chance to build "a mighty fortress of Graft" upon the foundation of their fear ("Confess your own ignorance and your own impotence, abandon yourself utterly, and then we, the sacred Caste, the Keepers of the Holy Secrets, will secure you pardon and respite"), those particular grifters were through history partners, and at that junior partners, to other and increasingly bigger criminals--helping keep the slaves, serfs and commoners subdued and exploited by more "worldly" rulers, be they lords of war or lords of capital, by upholding the cruelest features of the social order by way of promises of prosperity and salvation, threats of damnation and hellfire, the hand-waving of ritual, the stultification of the mind with obscurantism, and of course, in the case of those who failed to respond to the standard operating procedures, persecution of the heretic unto death, as they made of human life a swamp of oppression and hypocrisy.
The New Atheists, for the most part, would not dare such criticism of course, more inclined to laugh at the poor when they get taken in by the grifters, and rather less prone to acknowledge a relationship like Billy and John's. Moreover, rather than promoting xenophobic and often blatantly racist intolerance, Sinclair concerns himself above all with religion in the mainstream of Western life, and above all American society--with, of the seven "books" comprising Profits, after he has got through laying out the essentials of the racket and their origins in the first book ("The Church of the Conquerors"), Sinclair devoting three to the more established Protestant churches (numbers two, four and five, "The Church of Good Society," "The Church of the Slavers," "The Church of the Merchants"), and still another to more novel American institutions (number six, "The Church of the Quacks"). It is in keeping with this spirit that if Sinclair has something to say of the Lutheran Church of America's then-wartime enemy, Germany, he has rather more to say of the established church of its ally and mother country (and root and cousin of Sinclair's own absolutely mainline Episcopalian Church), England's Anglican Church; that if he devotes a whole book (number three, "The Church of the Servant-Girls") to Catholicism abroad and at home in a time when anti-Catholicism was a significant prejudice in American life, he at least endeavors to be clear that, unlike the nativists of his own time to whom he is anxious to give no aid and comfort, he is criticizing the institution of the Church and the policies explicitly laid down by its undisputed authorities, rather than persecuting people of Catholic background; and that when referencing other religions from ancient Mesopotamia to the present-day South Seas, his concern all the way through is with showing the universality of the pattern he describes, rather than mocking, let alone demonizing, the "Other" or "exotic."
It is also the case that if Sinclair pulls no punches in attacking "actually existing" organized religion, Sinclair also tells us that he wrote his book "in the direct line of the Christian tradition" and "for the cause of Jesus" as "a man who was brought up in the Church, and loved it with all his heart and soul, and was driven out by the formalists and hypocrites in high places," "thinks of Jesus more frequently and with more devotion than he thinks of any other man that lives or has ever lived on earth," and "has but one purpose in all that he says and does, to bring into reality the dream that Jesus dreamed of peace on earth and good will toward men," with the contrast with the outlook of his friend H.G. Wells helpful in grasping his attitude. Where Wells, in that underappreciated book that drew the threads of his life's work together, The Shape of Things to Come, pictured the world's churches falling into neglect for irrelevance and eventually being "cleared away like dead leaves" save for a "few-score beautiful chapels, churches and cathedrals" preserved for their artistic and historical interest (and the same happening with the houses of worship of every other religion)--what good the religions had ever stood for advanced by other institutions, in other ways in the era of the "World State"--Sinclair anticipated in his seventh and last book ("The Church of the Social Revolution") the modernization of religion saving the churches, which he saw as still fulfilling real and enduring human needs. Social progress, Sinclair declared in the chapter "The Church Redeemed," "will abolish poverty and parasitism . . . make temptations fewer, and the soul's path through life much easier," but would "not remove the necessity of struggle for individual virtue"--only raising the struggle to a higher level on which human beings would find "newer and higher types of virtue"--while humans would "more than ever" desire to gather "in beautiful places to voice their love of life and of one another," and do so the better in "places swept clean of superstition and tyranny." Indeed, Sinclair held that just "[a]s the Reformation compelled the Catholic Church to cleanse itself and abolish the grossest of its abuses," so the Catholic Church, and every other such institution, would also be "compel[led] . . . to repudiate its defense of parasitism and exploitation," and himself made so bold as to "record the prophecy that by the year 1950 all Catholic authorities will be denying that the Church ever opposed . . . true Socialism" the same way that those Authorities had already come to "deny that the Church ever . . . burned men for teaching that the earth moves around the sun," or "sold the right to commit crime."
Of course, Upton Sinclair (1878-1968) lived to see that as of 1950 no such thing had come about, or even come close to happening--and had he also lived for the fifty-six years between his passing and our day he would have found himself still waiting for such denials (indeed, seen Popes celebrated for their role as Anti-Communist Cold Warriors). Just as was the case with the institutions he criticized for their corruption what he saw wrong with organized religion proved far more enduring than he expected in those hopeful times, which has translated to another unpleasant irony--just as was the case with his other works of nonfiction, the reader may find Sinclair's concerns and arguments all too contemporary precisely because the world simply did not move forward, the issues and conflicts of his time still the issues and conflicts of ours, so much so that some speak of the twentieth century as unfinished.
These days that lack of resolution, which ever more gives the lie to the smug claims that history as a whole was finished at the twentieth century's chronological end, seems ever more the story of our times--not least as we feel ourselves living through another edition of the interwar era, amid long depression, the resurgence of fascism, and renewed threats of world war.
As the play on words that is the title of Sinclair's book makes clear, he regarded organized religion as a racket--and has been pretty much the same racket all over the world, since the dawn of recorded history. This has, of course, all been said over the years many, many times, but in an era in which it is generally the right that gets to have it say before a wide audience on this subject as on virtually all others so that the "New Atheists" dominate what passes for "rationalist" criticism of religion within the mainstream, Sinclair's coming at the matter of religion from a very different standpoint can by itself distinguish him from those other writers on the subject one is likely to encounter today. Beginning with a surreal and symbolic vision of a field of people trying to, literally, lift themselves up by their bootstraps toward the sky under the tutelage of priests, as the Wholesale Pickpockets Association takes advantage of their distraction to do what its name indicates to be the main activity of its members, Sinclair tells us explicitly in Profits that his "thesis is the effect of fixed dogma in producing mental paralysis, and the use of this mental paralysis by Economic Exploitation"--an effect he traces from the prehistoric past to the present day. That is to say, if prehistoric peoples' incapacity to tell the difference between reality, dream and fancy as they strove to explain the often perplexing and frightening world in which they lived gave an emergent priestly caste the chance to build "a mighty fortress of Graft" upon the foundation of their fear ("Confess your own ignorance and your own impotence, abandon yourself utterly, and then we, the sacred Caste, the Keepers of the Holy Secrets, will secure you pardon and respite"), those particular grifters were through history partners, and at that junior partners, to other and increasingly bigger criminals--helping keep the slaves, serfs and commoners subdued and exploited by more "worldly" rulers, be they lords of war or lords of capital, by upholding the cruelest features of the social order by way of promises of prosperity and salvation, threats of damnation and hellfire, the hand-waving of ritual, the stultification of the mind with obscurantism, and of course, in the case of those who failed to respond to the standard operating procedures, persecution of the heretic unto death, as they made of human life a swamp of oppression and hypocrisy.
The New Atheists, for the most part, would not dare such criticism of course, more inclined to laugh at the poor when they get taken in by the grifters, and rather less prone to acknowledge a relationship like Billy and John's. Moreover, rather than promoting xenophobic and often blatantly racist intolerance, Sinclair concerns himself above all with religion in the mainstream of Western life, and above all American society--with, of the seven "books" comprising Profits, after he has got through laying out the essentials of the racket and their origins in the first book ("The Church of the Conquerors"), Sinclair devoting three to the more established Protestant churches (numbers two, four and five, "The Church of Good Society," "The Church of the Slavers," "The Church of the Merchants"), and still another to more novel American institutions (number six, "The Church of the Quacks"). It is in keeping with this spirit that if Sinclair has something to say of the Lutheran Church of America's then-wartime enemy, Germany, he has rather more to say of the established church of its ally and mother country (and root and cousin of Sinclair's own absolutely mainline Episcopalian Church), England's Anglican Church; that if he devotes a whole book (number three, "The Church of the Servant-Girls") to Catholicism abroad and at home in a time when anti-Catholicism was a significant prejudice in American life, he at least endeavors to be clear that, unlike the nativists of his own time to whom he is anxious to give no aid and comfort, he is criticizing the institution of the Church and the policies explicitly laid down by its undisputed authorities, rather than persecuting people of Catholic background; and that when referencing other religions from ancient Mesopotamia to the present-day South Seas, his concern all the way through is with showing the universality of the pattern he describes, rather than mocking, let alone demonizing, the "Other" or "exotic."
It is also the case that if Sinclair pulls no punches in attacking "actually existing" organized religion, Sinclair also tells us that he wrote his book "in the direct line of the Christian tradition" and "for the cause of Jesus" as "a man who was brought up in the Church, and loved it with all his heart and soul, and was driven out by the formalists and hypocrites in high places," "thinks of Jesus more frequently and with more devotion than he thinks of any other man that lives or has ever lived on earth," and "has but one purpose in all that he says and does, to bring into reality the dream that Jesus dreamed of peace on earth and good will toward men," with the contrast with the outlook of his friend H.G. Wells helpful in grasping his attitude. Where Wells, in that underappreciated book that drew the threads of his life's work together, The Shape of Things to Come, pictured the world's churches falling into neglect for irrelevance and eventually being "cleared away like dead leaves" save for a "few-score beautiful chapels, churches and cathedrals" preserved for their artistic and historical interest (and the same happening with the houses of worship of every other religion)--what good the religions had ever stood for advanced by other institutions, in other ways in the era of the "World State"--Sinclair anticipated in his seventh and last book ("The Church of the Social Revolution") the modernization of religion saving the churches, which he saw as still fulfilling real and enduring human needs. Social progress, Sinclair declared in the chapter "The Church Redeemed," "will abolish poverty and parasitism . . . make temptations fewer, and the soul's path through life much easier," but would "not remove the necessity of struggle for individual virtue"--only raising the struggle to a higher level on which human beings would find "newer and higher types of virtue"--while humans would "more than ever" desire to gather "in beautiful places to voice their love of life and of one another," and do so the better in "places swept clean of superstition and tyranny." Indeed, Sinclair held that just "[a]s the Reformation compelled the Catholic Church to cleanse itself and abolish the grossest of its abuses," so the Catholic Church, and every other such institution, would also be "compel[led] . . . to repudiate its defense of parasitism and exploitation," and himself made so bold as to "record the prophecy that by the year 1950 all Catholic authorities will be denying that the Church ever opposed . . . true Socialism" the same way that those Authorities had already come to "deny that the Church ever . . . burned men for teaching that the earth moves around the sun," or "sold the right to commit crime."
Of course, Upton Sinclair (1878-1968) lived to see that as of 1950 no such thing had come about, or even come close to happening--and had he also lived for the fifty-six years between his passing and our day he would have found himself still waiting for such denials (indeed, seen Popes celebrated for their role as Anti-Communist Cold Warriors). Just as was the case with the institutions he criticized for their corruption what he saw wrong with organized religion proved far more enduring than he expected in those hopeful times, which has translated to another unpleasant irony--just as was the case with his other works of nonfiction, the reader may find Sinclair's concerns and arguments all too contemporary precisely because the world simply did not move forward, the issues and conflicts of his time still the issues and conflicts of ours, so much so that some speak of the twentieth century as unfinished.
These days that lack of resolution, which ever more gives the lie to the smug claims that history as a whole was finished at the twentieth century's chronological end, seems ever more the story of our times--not least as we feel ourselves living through another edition of the interwar era, amid long depression, the resurgence of fascism, and renewed threats of world war.
Of the Term "Populism"
In recent years usage of the word "populist" has exploded--almost always in reference to figures, tendencies, ideas, movements, parties of the right whose politics a short time earlier would have put them outside the mainstream; to what can be called, descriptively rather than pejoratively, the far right. Almost unquestioned by the mainstream media, some analysts of contemporary politics have nevertheless taken issue with that choice of terminology as obscuring the facts in highly consequential ways, among them Aurelien Mondon.
In making his case Mondon begins with an indisputable definitional mistake on the part of analysts--their conflating "populist" with "far right." After all, the two terms are not synonyms. There are populists who are not of the far right; and there are far rightists who are not populists; but one would never know that from how the "punditry" uses the word "populist." However, at a deeper level there is also the reality that even those far right tendencies which advertise themselves as populist have not only been elite-tolerated or elite-backed (without which tolerance and backing a far right tendency would be no more successful than the left tendencies which have such a hard time for lack of such tolerance and backing), but elite-founded and elite-led as they promote elite agendas. At the very least such facts impose on any serious analyst the obligation to admit that such a tendency is more complex in nature than the opposition of "the people" to "the elite" denoted by the use of the term "populist." It also draws attention to the fact that in many an ostensibly populist movement the popular component is not only slight, or only marginally supportive of the tendency in a field offering few choices amid much discontent, but mere "astroturf."
Because of its centrist ideological bias the media is ill-equipped, and frankly disinclined, to cope with such complexity, or penetrate beneath the surfaces of political life to get at underlying realities. After all, the epistemologically pessimistic, consensus-minded, center is neither particularly interested in nor optimistic about the intellectual endeavor involved in uncovering the truth, while being much more interested in adhering to the rules of "civil" discourse. These rules hold it to be "uncivil" to do anything less than take at their word anyone it has not ruled out of the discourse as an "extremist" and thus deprived of the legitimacy obliging it to show respect--all as the center avoids calling out extremism at the right end of the political spectrum, keeping them from being so ruled out (in contrast with the left the center treats as as inherently illegitimate, and excludable as a matter of course). Adding to the difficulty for the media on this particular point it is especially squeamish about attending to realities of class and of power--making it even less likely to call out a "populist" movement as other than that, the more easily in as the centrist is so attached to the image of working people as hippie-punching "hardhats" (with the fact that the thought of a right-wing working class is much more comfortable for the centrist than a proletariat out of an Eisenstein film not irrelevant to their promulgation of that image).
Altogether this gives the centrist media ample reason to respect far rightists who claim to be "populists" as being what they say they are--with, ironically, even those in the center troubled by the far right's ascent the more inclined to believe them because the centrist is so ready to believe in the wisdom and responsibility of elites, and the backwardness and viciousness of "the lower orders." However, as with so much else produced by centrist news coverage the resulting view of the situation is not only intellectually muddling, but highly advantageous to the right as against its rivals. In discussion of such groups it switches the subject from their politics to their presumed popularity, with the same switch uncritically affirming their claim to being the true representative "voice of the people" which, presumably unrepresented before or by anyone else, must be given a respectful hearing, and accordingly afforded a platform for the presentation of its views such as that same media would not have accorded it earlier (and again, such as it would never give the left).
As Mondon has made clear all this has played its part in mainstreaming the far right, enabling its electoral victories again and again--even as that same media condemns "extremism" in its profoundly hypocritical fashion.
In making his case Mondon begins with an indisputable definitional mistake on the part of analysts--their conflating "populist" with "far right." After all, the two terms are not synonyms. There are populists who are not of the far right; and there are far rightists who are not populists; but one would never know that from how the "punditry" uses the word "populist." However, at a deeper level there is also the reality that even those far right tendencies which advertise themselves as populist have not only been elite-tolerated or elite-backed (without which tolerance and backing a far right tendency would be no more successful than the left tendencies which have such a hard time for lack of such tolerance and backing), but elite-founded and elite-led as they promote elite agendas. At the very least such facts impose on any serious analyst the obligation to admit that such a tendency is more complex in nature than the opposition of "the people" to "the elite" denoted by the use of the term "populist." It also draws attention to the fact that in many an ostensibly populist movement the popular component is not only slight, or only marginally supportive of the tendency in a field offering few choices amid much discontent, but mere "astroturf."
Because of its centrist ideological bias the media is ill-equipped, and frankly disinclined, to cope with such complexity, or penetrate beneath the surfaces of political life to get at underlying realities. After all, the epistemologically pessimistic, consensus-minded, center is neither particularly interested in nor optimistic about the intellectual endeavor involved in uncovering the truth, while being much more interested in adhering to the rules of "civil" discourse. These rules hold it to be "uncivil" to do anything less than take at their word anyone it has not ruled out of the discourse as an "extremist" and thus deprived of the legitimacy obliging it to show respect--all as the center avoids calling out extremism at the right end of the political spectrum, keeping them from being so ruled out (in contrast with the left the center treats as as inherently illegitimate, and excludable as a matter of course). Adding to the difficulty for the media on this particular point it is especially squeamish about attending to realities of class and of power--making it even less likely to call out a "populist" movement as other than that, the more easily in as the centrist is so attached to the image of working people as hippie-punching "hardhats" (with the fact that the thought of a right-wing working class is much more comfortable for the centrist than a proletariat out of an Eisenstein film not irrelevant to their promulgation of that image).
Altogether this gives the centrist media ample reason to respect far rightists who claim to be "populists" as being what they say they are--with, ironically, even those in the center troubled by the far right's ascent the more inclined to believe them because the centrist is so ready to believe in the wisdom and responsibility of elites, and the backwardness and viciousness of "the lower orders." However, as with so much else produced by centrist news coverage the resulting view of the situation is not only intellectually muddling, but highly advantageous to the right as against its rivals. In discussion of such groups it switches the subject from their politics to their presumed popularity, with the same switch uncritically affirming their claim to being the true representative "voice of the people" which, presumably unrepresented before or by anyone else, must be given a respectful hearing, and accordingly afforded a platform for the presentation of its views such as that same media would not have accorded it earlier (and again, such as it would never give the left).
As Mondon has made clear all this has played its part in mainstreaming the far right, enabling its electoral victories again and again--even as that same media condemns "extremism" in its profoundly hypocritical fashion.
Rachel Reeves' Rancid Rhetoric: A Few More Thoughts
Recently taking up the issue of Rachel Reeves' first speech in Parliament about the new Labour government's fiscal "inheritance" my primary concern was establishing the hard specifics--just what it was that her government meant to do, and how it looked from the standpoint of the Labour party's promises and image. Quite predictably it affirmed the view of Starmer's government as promising to be the most right-wing in the century-long history of his party--and perhaps one of the more right-wing of any party.
Going over the rhetoric only reaffirms that, not only in such ways as the gratuitous reference to welfare cheats so dear to those who believe stupid lies about "welfare queens" living in luxury bankrupting the nation, or the none too subtle attacks on organized labor (with Ms. Reeves twice attacking public sector strikes as causes of the "inheritance"), but the way in which she broadly raised the matter of fiscal discipline, and situated what remain Britain's two principal political parties in relation to it. Making of "unfunded" the dirtiest word in the English language and throwing it about in the fashion of the pseudomature after they have just discovered swearing as she went down the list of "unfunded" Tory programs, she made it seem as if the Conservatives who presided over the country's brutal, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights-condemned austerity regimen of the 2010s were a pack of government program-mad lovers, upholders and extenders of Big Government and the welfare state who had to be reined in by stern Labour budget balancers in a profound reversal of the simple-minded stereotypes ceaselessly promulgated by Establishment media and expertise.
Much of this, of course, was the sort of cynical grandstanding that the politics-loving courtiers of the powerful, to their great and eternal discredit, absolutely admire and adore, and much prefer to cover as against the policy that is actually the end of all the nonsense, and really affects people's lives. Still, for a moment take it at face value and think--What if this really is, if only in some slight degree, how the world looks to Ms. Reeves, Keir Starmer and their colleagues? If by the standard of these persons Tory austerity really was spendthrift welfare statism, with all that implies for what the British people can expect under Starmer?
Really, really think about it.
Going over the rhetoric only reaffirms that, not only in such ways as the gratuitous reference to welfare cheats so dear to those who believe stupid lies about "welfare queens" living in luxury bankrupting the nation, or the none too subtle attacks on organized labor (with Ms. Reeves twice attacking public sector strikes as causes of the "inheritance"), but the way in which she broadly raised the matter of fiscal discipline, and situated what remain Britain's two principal political parties in relation to it. Making of "unfunded" the dirtiest word in the English language and throwing it about in the fashion of the pseudomature after they have just discovered swearing as she went down the list of "unfunded" Tory programs, she made it seem as if the Conservatives who presided over the country's brutal, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights-condemned austerity regimen of the 2010s were a pack of government program-mad lovers, upholders and extenders of Big Government and the welfare state who had to be reined in by stern Labour budget balancers in a profound reversal of the simple-minded stereotypes ceaselessly promulgated by Establishment media and expertise.
Much of this, of course, was the sort of cynical grandstanding that the politics-loving courtiers of the powerful, to their great and eternal discredit, absolutely admire and adore, and much prefer to cover as against the policy that is actually the end of all the nonsense, and really affects people's lives. Still, for a moment take it at face value and think--What if this really is, if only in some slight degree, how the world looks to Ms. Reeves, Keir Starmer and their colleagues? If by the standard of these persons Tory austerity really was spendthrift welfare statism, with all that implies for what the British people can expect under Starmer?
Really, really think about it.
Of Rachel Reeves' July 29, 2024 Speech in Parliament
While no sane person expects that politicians will keep their promises to the broad working public (their promises to the elite interests that own them are a different matter), and expects less and less of politicians the more and more as they have "Establishment approved" seals, centrist sensibilities, technocratic pretensions, and a penchant for whining "I want to be Prime Minister" when called out for every disappointment of their supporters, Sir Keir Starmer's brazenness is still something to behold, with his Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves' speech a scarce month after the election that brought Starmer into 10 Downing Street living down to the lowest expectations those who voted for him with noses held, or did not vote for him at all, would have of a Starmer government. Pretending that the state of the country's finances had somehow been kept from them in spite of the fact that no observer of these matters of any intelligence would believe such a story, Starmer's Chancellor--mere weeks after her party's publishing a General Election Manifesto that, if still pathetically watered down from the pledges that Starmer made back when becoming party leader was the step he had to take in order to hope to someday "be Prime Minister," still promised that "There will be no return to austerity" in black and white (you may find this in the section "Economic Stability," specifically on page 19 of the document)--announced the "discovery" of a £22 billion hole in the budget and an assortment of "tough" and "difficult" decisions, including the following:
• The abandonment of plans to institute the "Advanced British Standard" in education (Reeves dispensing with funding efforts to improve teacher recruitment and retention, and student outcomes in math and English).
• The abandonment of £800 million of "unfunded transport projects," including work on the A303 and A27 motorways, and canceling those "Restoring Our Railways" (I assume she meant "Restoring Your Railways") projects to restore railway system lines and stations "which have not yet commenced."
• A "complete reset of the New Hospitals programme" supposed to deliver forty new hospitals to the country.
• The cancellation of plans "to introduce . . . charging reforms" in the adult social care aiding the aged, disabled and ill that would have "increased the generosity of means-tests."
• The cessation of "the Winter Fuel Payment" that helps older people with their heating bills to those who are "not in receipt of Pension Credit . . . from this year onwards."
• The extraction of "at least" another £3 billion in savings from government departments to compensate for public sector pay increases in a manner as yet undetermined.
Reeves announced other "tough" decisions, like the alteration of the planned terms of privatization for its holdings in NatWest bank, but simply sticking with those more obvious items--drawing back from previously promised funding in education, the country's physical infrastructure/transport system, hospital-building and adult social care, cutting off winter fuel payments, a government turning its departments upside down to shake change out of their pockets, and all that in the name of transparent bad faith assertions about unexpected budgetary shortfalls--quite suffices to justify Ms. Reeves as having presented a full-blown austerity program, with all this maybe just the beginning as governments these past many decades have had a habit of overdelivering when it comes to what has been euphemistically called "Reinventing Government," just as they underdeliver on their social promises.
Moreover, even setting aside Reeves' apparent inability to speak to the British public in any but the most insultingly patronizing tone--as seen in her her past references to the nonexistence of "magic money trees" and her making a refrain out of the phrase "If we cannot afford it, we cannot do it" in this speech--this did not augur well for those fearful of more to come, maybe much more.
Nor did her gratuitous reference to "the unacceptable levels of fraud . . . in our welfare system," with its evocation of right-wing rants that welfare cheats are somehow the ones bankrupting the country.
It also seems worth noting that within the brief statement she twice blamed industrial action for contributing to the non-magic money tree government possessing's problems (in the National Health Service, and in the rail services) to the tune of almost £5 billion. The result is that this Labour government is blaming not just the Tories but the workers as having compelled these "tough" and "difficult" decisions--which is something to remember when they consider just what this government will be like dealing with the country's unions as well as what it will be like dealing with the country's finances.
• The abandonment of plans to institute the "Advanced British Standard" in education (Reeves dispensing with funding efforts to improve teacher recruitment and retention, and student outcomes in math and English).
• The abandonment of £800 million of "unfunded transport projects," including work on the A303 and A27 motorways, and canceling those "Restoring Our Railways" (I assume she meant "Restoring Your Railways") projects to restore railway system lines and stations "which have not yet commenced."
• A "complete reset of the New Hospitals programme" supposed to deliver forty new hospitals to the country.
• The cancellation of plans "to introduce . . . charging reforms" in the adult social care aiding the aged, disabled and ill that would have "increased the generosity of means-tests."
• The cessation of "the Winter Fuel Payment" that helps older people with their heating bills to those who are "not in receipt of Pension Credit . . . from this year onwards."
• The extraction of "at least" another £3 billion in savings from government departments to compensate for public sector pay increases in a manner as yet undetermined.
Reeves announced other "tough" decisions, like the alteration of the planned terms of privatization for its holdings in NatWest bank, but simply sticking with those more obvious items--drawing back from previously promised funding in education, the country's physical infrastructure/transport system, hospital-building and adult social care, cutting off winter fuel payments, a government turning its departments upside down to shake change out of their pockets, and all that in the name of transparent bad faith assertions about unexpected budgetary shortfalls--quite suffices to justify Ms. Reeves as having presented a full-blown austerity program, with all this maybe just the beginning as governments these past many decades have had a habit of overdelivering when it comes to what has been euphemistically called "Reinventing Government," just as they underdeliver on their social promises.
Moreover, even setting aside Reeves' apparent inability to speak to the British public in any but the most insultingly patronizing tone--as seen in her her past references to the nonexistence of "magic money trees" and her making a refrain out of the phrase "If we cannot afford it, we cannot do it" in this speech--this did not augur well for those fearful of more to come, maybe much more.
Nor did her gratuitous reference to "the unacceptable levels of fraud . . . in our welfare system," with its evocation of right-wing rants that welfare cheats are somehow the ones bankrupting the country.
It also seems worth noting that within the brief statement she twice blamed industrial action for contributing to the non-magic money tree government possessing's problems (in the National Health Service, and in the rail services) to the tune of almost £5 billion. The result is that this Labour government is blaming not just the Tories but the workers as having compelled these "tough" and "difficult" decisions--which is something to remember when they consider just what this government will be like dealing with the country's unions as well as what it will be like dealing with the country's finances.
Stuart Hall and the Labour Right in 2024
Stuart Hall remarked in his 1988 book The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left that what he called "the right wing of the labor movement" (which I think can be identified with a Labour right that had not yet cast aside any pretense of being a labor movement at all) "has no ideas of any compelling quality, except the instinct for short-term political survival." Indeed, "[i]t would not know an ideological struggle if it stumbled across one in the dark," while coming to the matter of struggle generally "[t]he only 'struggle' it engages in with any trace of conviction is the one against the left."
The remark has become the sort of thing quoted again and again--recently appearing in Taj Ali's piece on Keir Starmer's long and rather dirty war on the left in The Nation back in June. This is because, as the nearly four decades that have elapsed since Hall wrote those words demonstrate, many of them have rung true again and again. Ideas of compelling quality? What the longtime face of the tendency he wrote of, Tony Blair, had to offer was the non-idea of the "Third Way," Keir Starmer his "securonomics"--whose unimportance is exemplified by how one need not refer to them at all in analyzing their statements and actions, and might indeed simply distract themselves from that object by attending to them. (Certainly reference to the "Third Way" seemed to me quite beside the point when I wrote about Blair's record, just as the one reference to "securonomics" in the 136 pages of Labour Party's 2024 General Election Manifesto that never rises above banality seemed far from essential to analyzing that document as a statement of Starmer's economic vision, or fulfillment or non-fulfillment of his past promises in that area.) And Starmer in particular has demonstrated that "[t]he only 'struggle'" that this tendency "engages in with any trace of conviction is the one against the left."
However, I am not in full agreement with the rest of the statement. The precise reason that the Labour right does fight so fiercely against the left is because it does know ideological struggle. It just happens to be firmly on the side of the right against the left in that struggle--as has generally been the case with "centrists" of this variety, who (like everyone else in politics) are most definitely ideologues themselves even as they lamely equate "ideology" with the intellectual and political sins of the left. Indeed, their ideological position can seem to me to take precedence over "the instinct for short-term political survival," focusing on which too much confuses the issue. If the courtiers of the powerful delight in inflicting on their readers the image of a right-wing Labour leader at election time as "a man carrying a priceless Ming vase across a highly polished floor" the reality is that it was in each case the left of their party rather than the opposition of those who would look right that they most feared, with the right giving the centrist their excuse to demand left-leaning voters hold their noses and vote for them, in spite of the strategy commonly producing dismal results, as indeed it did in July 2024. Though the conventional understanding was that Starmer's ming vase-carrying Labour defeated the Conservatives by a landslide, the reality was that Labour won the election on the basis of very few votes indeed. Where Labour's comparable victories had typically seen it get the votes of 30 percent+ of the electorate, and even Jeremy Corbyn in 2017 managed to get 28 percent, Starmer got the King's invitation to form a government on the basis of a mere 20 percent, even amid a genuine (if perhaps temporary) collapse in support for the Conservatives under Rishi Sunak. The result is that the Labour right's "instinct for short-term political survival" has already proven less than impressive, and is going to be very severely tested in what promise to be the crisis-filled years ahead.
The remark has become the sort of thing quoted again and again--recently appearing in Taj Ali's piece on Keir Starmer's long and rather dirty war on the left in The Nation back in June. This is because, as the nearly four decades that have elapsed since Hall wrote those words demonstrate, many of them have rung true again and again. Ideas of compelling quality? What the longtime face of the tendency he wrote of, Tony Blair, had to offer was the non-idea of the "Third Way," Keir Starmer his "securonomics"--whose unimportance is exemplified by how one need not refer to them at all in analyzing their statements and actions, and might indeed simply distract themselves from that object by attending to them. (Certainly reference to the "Third Way" seemed to me quite beside the point when I wrote about Blair's record, just as the one reference to "securonomics" in the 136 pages of Labour Party's 2024 General Election Manifesto that never rises above banality seemed far from essential to analyzing that document as a statement of Starmer's economic vision, or fulfillment or non-fulfillment of his past promises in that area.) And Starmer in particular has demonstrated that "[t]he only 'struggle'" that this tendency "engages in with any trace of conviction is the one against the left."
However, I am not in full agreement with the rest of the statement. The precise reason that the Labour right does fight so fiercely against the left is because it does know ideological struggle. It just happens to be firmly on the side of the right against the left in that struggle--as has generally been the case with "centrists" of this variety, who (like everyone else in politics) are most definitely ideologues themselves even as they lamely equate "ideology" with the intellectual and political sins of the left. Indeed, their ideological position can seem to me to take precedence over "the instinct for short-term political survival," focusing on which too much confuses the issue. If the courtiers of the powerful delight in inflicting on their readers the image of a right-wing Labour leader at election time as "a man carrying a priceless Ming vase across a highly polished floor" the reality is that it was in each case the left of their party rather than the opposition of those who would look right that they most feared, with the right giving the centrist their excuse to demand left-leaning voters hold their noses and vote for them, in spite of the strategy commonly producing dismal results, as indeed it did in July 2024. Though the conventional understanding was that Starmer's ming vase-carrying Labour defeated the Conservatives by a landslide, the reality was that Labour won the election on the basis of very few votes indeed. Where Labour's comparable victories had typically seen it get the votes of 30 percent+ of the electorate, and even Jeremy Corbyn in 2017 managed to get 28 percent, Starmer got the King's invitation to form a government on the basis of a mere 20 percent, even amid a genuine (if perhaps temporary) collapse in support for the Conservatives under Rishi Sunak. The result is that the Labour right's "instinct for short-term political survival" has already proven less than impressive, and is going to be very severely tested in what promise to be the crisis-filled years ahead.
Thorstein Veblen and Today's Arguments About the Draft
In his important book The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904) Thorstein Veblen's great theme was the increasing conflict between the motivations and prerogatives of business on the one hand, and the demands of modern industry on the other--with the latter of which he identified the needs of society in the age of the "machine process." Much of this was a matter of the clash between businessmen oriented to quick profits through financial operations--as with what we today call "financial engineering"--and the requirements of the "real" economy, and not least a technologically progressing manufacturing base, ever undermined and disrupted by the associated management and investment patterns in ways that seem all too familiar in our era of "financialization." However, there was also the matter of the broader culture associated with all this, with the rationalistic, matter-of-fact, cause-and-effect modern culture at odds with the comparatively old-fashioned outlook of business and professions key to it, like the law as it relates to property and contract.
Of course, the businessmen who increasingly defined conservatism naturally resisted that more rationalistic outlook, in part by supporting conservative institutions (the Jacobins of the eighteenth century learning to love throne and altar and the rest of the Old Regime package), with it seeming to Veblen that the most important of these was the militarization of society. Besides being instrumental to their business interests of "pecuniary mastery and . . . commercial solvency" in an "age of imperialism," he held its "incidental, disciplinary effects . . . no less important." As he put it, "a warlike business policy . . . makes for a conservative animus on the part of the populace." The abeyance of civil rights inside armies, and under martial law, is of course always attractive to those who have power, and fear and hate dissent, and so are "the sensational appeals to patriotic pride and animosity made by victories, defeats, or comparisons of military and naval strength" which "direct the popular interest to other, nobler, institutionally less hazardous matters than the unequal distribution of wealth or of creature comforts." Veblen also adds that the "[m]ilitary training" that becomes universal in a "nation in arms" implementing a policy of universal service "is a training in ceremonial precedence, arbitrary command . . . unquestioning obedience," and in "think[ing] in warlike terms of rank, authority, and subordination," with the habits formed in such a "servile" organization where "[i]nsubordination is the deadly sin" carried over into civilian life, training the population "into habits of subordination" and away from democratic attitudes.
Indeed, in a culture that, growing increasingly civilized, was becoming worrisomely so for an elite whose privileges owed to an "uncivilized"--barbarian--social condition and social outlook, war was a source of welcome rebarbarization ("the stress on subordination and mastery and the insistence on gradations of dignity and honor incident to a militant organization . . . an effective school in barbarian methods of thought").
Today, as talk of a draft resurges, almost all of it half-baked, with cynical cultural warfare absolutely pervading it (not least, appeals by politicians as artless as they are sleazy and the courtiers of the news media to old right-wingers who hate young folks)--to say nothing of a lot of begging some very serious questions about foreign policy and civil-military relations, and what the existing social model has meant for the plausibility or legitimacy of calls for "sacrifice" and "solidarity"--we hear much of the supposed virtues of a draft, and the supposedly salutary effects it would have on the young put through it. Indeed, even publications like the Guardian (if as close as one gets to a left perspective in a major newspaper of the English-speaking world, ever showing its essential centrism) in a recent piece which indulged in a bit of "both sidesism" as it treated the rightist position with considerable respect.
Perhaps the folks who run that paper never read Veblen. (I get the impression that they haven't read a lot of things.) Still, what Veblen had to say about the effects of a draft--that its really "salutary" effect is spreading authoritarian, hierarchical, inegalitarian, undemocratic attitudes through society, all as the broader militarization with which it is associated diverts attention from socioeconomic issues and restricts the civil rights that activists concerned with socioeconomic issues so sorely need when protesting those matters--should always be much on the minds of any who would presume to consider the effects of a draft in at all a critical fashion, and certainly those who would even presume to be on the side of democracy and freedom. So, too, should what conscription means for the conscripted in a more immediate way, very neatly summed up by Jonah Walters--the more in as a "crime against humanity" is precisely what so many haters of the young, and "apologists and admirers of injustice, misery, and brutality" in general, are eager to inflict on their nation's youth.
Of course, the businessmen who increasingly defined conservatism naturally resisted that more rationalistic outlook, in part by supporting conservative institutions (the Jacobins of the eighteenth century learning to love throne and altar and the rest of the Old Regime package), with it seeming to Veblen that the most important of these was the militarization of society. Besides being instrumental to their business interests of "pecuniary mastery and . . . commercial solvency" in an "age of imperialism," he held its "incidental, disciplinary effects . . . no less important." As he put it, "a warlike business policy . . . makes for a conservative animus on the part of the populace." The abeyance of civil rights inside armies, and under martial law, is of course always attractive to those who have power, and fear and hate dissent, and so are "the sensational appeals to patriotic pride and animosity made by victories, defeats, or comparisons of military and naval strength" which "direct the popular interest to other, nobler, institutionally less hazardous matters than the unequal distribution of wealth or of creature comforts." Veblen also adds that the "[m]ilitary training" that becomes universal in a "nation in arms" implementing a policy of universal service "is a training in ceremonial precedence, arbitrary command . . . unquestioning obedience," and in "think[ing] in warlike terms of rank, authority, and subordination," with the habits formed in such a "servile" organization where "[i]nsubordination is the deadly sin" carried over into civilian life, training the population "into habits of subordination" and away from democratic attitudes.
Indeed, in a culture that, growing increasingly civilized, was becoming worrisomely so for an elite whose privileges owed to an "uncivilized"--barbarian--social condition and social outlook, war was a source of welcome rebarbarization ("the stress on subordination and mastery and the insistence on gradations of dignity and honor incident to a militant organization . . . an effective school in barbarian methods of thought").
Today, as talk of a draft resurges, almost all of it half-baked, with cynical cultural warfare absolutely pervading it (not least, appeals by politicians as artless as they are sleazy and the courtiers of the news media to old right-wingers who hate young folks)--to say nothing of a lot of begging some very serious questions about foreign policy and civil-military relations, and what the existing social model has meant for the plausibility or legitimacy of calls for "sacrifice" and "solidarity"--we hear much of the supposed virtues of a draft, and the supposedly salutary effects it would have on the young put through it. Indeed, even publications like the Guardian (if as close as one gets to a left perspective in a major newspaper of the English-speaking world, ever showing its essential centrism) in a recent piece which indulged in a bit of "both sidesism" as it treated the rightist position with considerable respect.
Perhaps the folks who run that paper never read Veblen. (I get the impression that they haven't read a lot of things.) Still, what Veblen had to say about the effects of a draft--that its really "salutary" effect is spreading authoritarian, hierarchical, inegalitarian, undemocratic attitudes through society, all as the broader militarization with which it is associated diverts attention from socioeconomic issues and restricts the civil rights that activists concerned with socioeconomic issues so sorely need when protesting those matters--should always be much on the minds of any who would presume to consider the effects of a draft in at all a critical fashion, and certainly those who would even presume to be on the side of democracy and freedom. So, too, should what conscription means for the conscripted in a more immediate way, very neatly summed up by Jonah Walters--the more in as a "crime against humanity" is precisely what so many haters of the young, and "apologists and admirers of injustice, misery, and brutality" in general, are eager to inflict on their nation's youth.
Saturday, July 27, 2024
The Political Center and the Double Election of July 2024
Centrism is a conservative, elitist, ideology, one in respects abstruse, with a view of democracy as a thing best carefully delimited and intensively managed so as not to upset the status quo. Where the centrists' own policymaking is concerned they are pessimistic about and not really interested in getting to the roots of issues and solving problems--that is the dangerous behavior of "ideologues" and "extremists" in their view--but rather keeping problems from threatening the "consensus" in favor of the aforementioned status quo (if only by sustaining the hope among those desirous of action that they might yet get it, rather than actually doing anything for them).
Centrists, who are squeamish about ideology generally and in denial about being ideologues themselves are disinclined to spell all this out, the more in as it is just not very attractive intellectually or emotionally, to such a degree that it has a very limited popular base, how limited is evident in comparison of the center with the more avowedly conservative right with its nationalistic appeals and culture war-mongering, and the left with its demand for a freer, more just, society. What enabled centrists to win elections was, especially in a context where the center (in collaboration with the right) succeeded in blocking the left, delivering a certain amount of actual reform. However, the centrist embrace of neoliberalism ruled that out (and made the hope on which centrists expect the politically frustrated to live look increasingly empty).
The result, of course, has been a tough time for the center, underlined by the elections in Britain and France this past month. If Anne Applebaum crowed about the Keir Starmer-led Labour as a triumph of the center over populists and extremists to his left and right, the reality was not a Labour triumph but a Conservative collapse substantially due to challenge from further right as the third party vote generally surged--enabling Labour to win the election with the support of just three-quarters the proportion of the electorate that Jeremy Corbyn commanded in 2017 (when he lost). Meanwhile in France, to the evident shock and dismay of a news media not so secretly looking forward to reporting a far right victory (they do so love to "troll the libs" and "punch the hippies" with large, splashy, images of rightists exulting in a triumph at the polls), the left-leaning New Popular Front came in first in an election that had, in contrast with the record-low turnout seen in Britain, a very high turnout bespeaking the force of opposition to the far right coalition led by the National Rally--and leaving France in a situation of unprecedented crisis since Macron did not get the majority for the center that he was counting on (Macron's Ensemble coalition getting less than 25 percent of the vote, and a mere 161 of the 577 seats in parliament).
No reasonable person can look at those two elections and think that either was an affirmation of the center by the broad public, testimony to the wisdom of its leaders, or source of "lessons" for how to enable the center to hold in these times.
Centrists, who are squeamish about ideology generally and in denial about being ideologues themselves are disinclined to spell all this out, the more in as it is just not very attractive intellectually or emotionally, to such a degree that it has a very limited popular base, how limited is evident in comparison of the center with the more avowedly conservative right with its nationalistic appeals and culture war-mongering, and the left with its demand for a freer, more just, society. What enabled centrists to win elections was, especially in a context where the center (in collaboration with the right) succeeded in blocking the left, delivering a certain amount of actual reform. However, the centrist embrace of neoliberalism ruled that out (and made the hope on which centrists expect the politically frustrated to live look increasingly empty).
The result, of course, has been a tough time for the center, underlined by the elections in Britain and France this past month. If Anne Applebaum crowed about the Keir Starmer-led Labour as a triumph of the center over populists and extremists to his left and right, the reality was not a Labour triumph but a Conservative collapse substantially due to challenge from further right as the third party vote generally surged--enabling Labour to win the election with the support of just three-quarters the proportion of the electorate that Jeremy Corbyn commanded in 2017 (when he lost). Meanwhile in France, to the evident shock and dismay of a news media not so secretly looking forward to reporting a far right victory (they do so love to "troll the libs" and "punch the hippies" with large, splashy, images of rightists exulting in a triumph at the polls), the left-leaning New Popular Front came in first in an election that had, in contrast with the record-low turnout seen in Britain, a very high turnout bespeaking the force of opposition to the far right coalition led by the National Rally--and leaving France in a situation of unprecedented crisis since Macron did not get the majority for the center that he was counting on (Macron's Ensemble coalition getting less than 25 percent of the vote, and a mere 161 of the 577 seats in parliament).
No reasonable person can look at those two elections and think that either was an affirmation of the center by the broad public, testimony to the wisdom of its leaders, or source of "lessons" for how to enable the center to hold in these times.
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