Tuesday, November 25, 2008

Societal Complexity and Diminishing Returns in Security (Continued)

Rising Security Costs
Making matters worse is the rising cost of the forces required to provide a given level of security, let alone the higher one that a society with depleted slack and more sensitive and numerous vulnerabilities would appear to require. Security forces, after all, are no less prone than other societal institutions to becoming more complex or to showing diminishing returns to investment in complexity.

These trends are exemplified by the increasing concern with asymmetrical warfare. While the term has been badly abused in the past decade, the focus in such discussions is generally on how smaller powers can use low-technology weapons and commercially available resources to defeat more powerful militaries.76 Put in the language of complexity theory, it can be described as a less complex force's strategy for exploiting the vulnerabilities of a more complex opponent. Not surprisingly, these scenarios typically assume that small powers are on the defensive against an enemy invested in "heavy metal" weapons, vulnerable to global public opinion, and with a low tolerance for casualties—in other words, an opponent operating with little slack.77

The entry of weapons of mass destruction into such scenarios only highlights the exorbitant cost of reliably defeating (rather than deterring the use of) those weapons, a mission likely to be one of the principal sources of new military investment in the years to come, as with U.S. investments in missile defense. The ability to reliably shoot down such missiles poses extremely difficult problems, sufficiently great that whether it can be done at all is highly controversial.78 Even though missile defense certainly poses unique technical challenges, the larger problem is arguably its being a new kind of mission, namely planning for confrontations with the "strength in madness" of irrational actors.79 Arguments for missile defense assume an opponent prepared to strike despite the certainty of its devastation in a counterattack, and so is looked to for a level of security far beyond the levels traditional realist calculations were meant to provide.80

Certainly, many states have responded to these various challenges simply by buying less in the way of defense, spending a smaller part of their incomes on their militaries. Such reductions, however, may be illusory, the character of security spending instead shifting, given that measurements of defense spending (for instance, as a percentage of GDP) tend to cover solely military expenditures. Law enforcement and emergency management units, let alone private security expenditures, are simply not represented, but these are significant and growing. Largely excluding military expenditures, the United States spends $100 billion a year on homeland defense, approximately 1 percent of its GDP.81 Law enforcement cost the United States 1.57 percent of GDP in 1999.82 According to a conservative estimate, private business spends $55 billion annually on private security in the United States (another 0.5 percent of GDP), a figure expected to rise by 50-100 percent as a consequence of the September 11 terrorist attacks.83

All of this suggests that the portion of modern economies devoted to defense spending may be significantly underestimated by the conventional measures by 3 percent or more. Added to the elevated level of defense spending following the September 11 attacks, far more than 4 percent when the costs of operations in Iraq and elsewhere are included, it appears that U.S. spending on security has returned to Cold War levels. Although the argument can be made that this is only because Cold War-era expenditures on criminal justice and private security are not included in such a comparison, this would require ignoring the presently elevated importance of such expenditures. The line between war and crime has become increasingly blurred as nonstate actors such as warlords and criminal syndicates become the principal participants in armed conflict, largely subsidized by illegal activities such as drug trafficking, and for that matter, the criminalization of states.84 The same is true for the agencies combating such organizations, where the line between military and police forces in prosecuting the war on drugs or protecting states from terrorist threats to the homeland has become blurrier, a point raised by the room for argument over whether al-Qa'ida is a criminal rather than military threat.85 In either case, however, the cost of law enforcement rose 140 percent in relative terms in the United States from 0.65 percent of GDP in 1965 to 1.57 percent (as mentioned above), and private security spending is generally thought to have risen over the period as well. As observers sometimes put it, there were twice as many public police as private ones in 1970, but the reverse was the case by 1990, despite the large jump in public expenditure on law enforcement.

Consequently, a comparison between figures including these other categories of security spending in addition to defense still suggests a trend of diminishing returns to these investments. The movement in this direction is only continuing with the war on terror. This fact appears doubly problematic when the information burden is considered alongside the financial one. New technologies and a rising volume of communication and trade continually increase the amount of activity that must be watched, and it seems that the burden is already unsustainable. An examination of the events prior to September 11 suggests that the problem was less one of inadequate intelligence collection than inadequate processing and coordination.86 The National Security Agency, for instance, was already collecting far more intelligence than it could analyze effectively or quickly. Congressional inquiries showed an enormous backlog of unexamined communication elsewhere, totaling "millions of hours of talk by suspected terrorists—including 35% of all Arabic-language national-security wiretaps by the FBI—had gone untranslated and untranscribed."87 One notable example was a message since interpreted as warning of the attack, but nottranslated until the next day, despite the priority given to al-Qa'ida communications.

The problem has likely worsened as a result of the war on terror, given that the number of wiretaps tripled after the attack, and the difficulty government agencies have had acquiring additional personnel with the requisite linguistic skills.88 Over the longer term, the rapid growth in the volume of communication will outstrip anything likely to be achieved by efforts to hire more analysts; simply keeping up with the rise in email flows would mean watching a volume of communication growing by about 16 percent a year. Reforms hinging on stepped-up intelligence collection, epitomized by the proposed Total Information Awareness program, may only worsen the problem by gathering massive amounts of data acknowledged to be of minimal security value.89 "More" is simply not synonymous with "better" in this case.

Investments in complexity seem to have passed a point of diminishing returns in the area of security by creating higher levels of vulnerability, which can only be borne by disproportionately rising security expenditures. Less slack exists to absorb shocks; more points of attack emerge, as do more connections for radiating the effects of the attack throughout the whole of a system; and the means for defending those points becomes more costly.

The result is a strained society under constant pressure to do more with less. In some cases, however, the reverse may be true: that is, accomplishing less when more needs to be done. A search for alternatives to the continued pursuit of diminishing returns is a logical response, to stop investing in areas that do not pay off and look to investing in those that do. One way may be to concentrate on ameliorating the maladaptive effects of adaptation, as by building more fuel-efficient automobiles to curb pollution and dependence on unreliable foreign energy supplies. Of course, the diminution of slack means fewer resources with which to pursue such approaches, and the tendency toward diminishing returns to complexity generally implies less promise, but certain policies could well pay off, as with the example given above.

The long-term solution to such problems, as Tainter suggests, is likely to be a new technology or an "energy subsidy" (i.e., the acquisition of greater resources through expansion). Given that mere resource extraction has reached its limits as a solution to the problem of diminishing returns, a technological solution is more necessary than ever, suggesting another area for careful investment for producing increasing returns. The precise character of the technological solution, however, is far from obvious. Investment in information technology, widely touted as the area of increasing returns, is insufficient by itself given its dependence on mechanical industries and a fossil-fuel energy base. Moreover, some of the ways in which it is presently exploited mayeven contribute to the problem.90 Even if government and business have made unwise use of the available technologies, however, and more restrained policies are deemed to be well in order, more research and development maybe called for. The same growth in computing power that has accelerated equipment depreciation may also enable advances in artificial intelligence androbotics, allowing them to bear much of the burden of complexity in thefuture.91 Moreover, where information technology has been the object of overinvestment, areas such as renewable energy sources have arguably seen underinvestment.

At the same time, fortifying or monitoring everything must be explicitly recognized as impossible, and security as inherently imperfect. Certain improvements in infrastructure design or intelligence collection may prove rewarding, but these are likely to be comparatively modest in contrast with terrorist- proofing whole societies or "total information" efforts—such as, perhaps, concentrating improvements on key nodes in scale-free-type networks. From a societal-level perspective, the best course is likely to be decoupling key systems so that attacks on any one point do less damage, and certain technologies could facilitate this. The renewable energy sources most likely to supplant fossil fuels have the potential to underlie a highly decentralized system of energy production and distribution.92 A move to more numerous, smaller airports and aircraft could do this for transportation.93 "Desktop manufacturing" and variants on it, may offer a basis for manufacturing that is at once more efficient and less tightly coupled, potentially culminating in viable, nearly self-sufficient microfactories in the future.94

Finally, assessments of security costs must count private security and law enforcement and emergency services expenditures as part of a state's spending on security: for example, baggage scanners should be recognized as just as much a defense buy as a fighter plane. Better accounting needs to be made of hidden costs such as higher insurance premiums resulting from terrorism. With or without such accounting, it is admittedly less clear whether investment in areas such as police and private security has yet reached a point of diminishing returns. What is clear, however, is that the relative and absolute cost of these activities has increased massively in a relatively short period of time, and with uncertain results.

Better accounting may contribute to better decisionmaking over the long term, but in the end the solution is likely to remain primarily technical. Of course, there is a danger in pinning the hopes for resolving such pressing problems on unproven technologies. History is replete with technological revolutions that naysayers said would never happen. There have also been disappointments, however—for example, the overoptimistic claims about space exploration and commercial fusion. It is also dangerous to ignore the significant downsides that exist to these technologies, or to disregard the fact that the "social ingenuity" (to borrow Thomas Homer-Dixon's phrase) for implementing them must go hand in hand with the technical ingenuity that created them.95 Nevertheless, their playing a critical role in a solution to this problem is a possibility, and one that should be of concern not only to futurists but to students of security as well.

1. Joseph Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.91-126, 209-216.

2. Gene I. Rochlin, Trapped in the Net: The Unanticipated Consequences of Computerization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.213.

3. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.80-81; and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp.76-79.

4. T.F.H. Allen, Joseph Tainter, and Thomas W. Hoekstra, Supply-Side Sustainability (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p.346.

5. Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap: Facing the Economic, Environmental, and Other Challenges of an Increasingly Complex and Unpredictable Future (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), pp.111-115.

6. Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p.78.

7. Allen, Tainter, and Hoekstra, Supply-Side Sustainability, p.64.

8. W. Brian Arthur, "On the Evolution of Complexity," in G. Cowan, D. Pines, and D. Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus, 1994), pp.65-78.

9. Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.297.

10. Ibid.

11. Arthur, "On the Evolution of Complexity," p.69.

12. Ibid., p.74.

13. Murray Gell-Mann, "Complex Adaptive Systems," in Cowan, Pines, and Meltzer, Complexity, p.22.

14. Ibid.

15. Phillip W. Anderson, "The Eightfold Way to a Theory of Complexity," in Cowan, Pines, and Meltzer, Complexity, p.11.

16. This is consistent with the recommendations of complexity specialists in the past, who have proposed two methods, "algorithmic complexity"—namely the quantity of information needed to reproduce a system's behavior—and "self-dissimilarity," which refers to the difference in characteristics of a system at varying levels of analysis. For their treatments of these respective approaches, see George Chatin, Algorithmic Information Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp.91-126; and David Wolpert and William Macready, "Self-Dissimilarity: An Empirical Measure of Complexity," Working Paper No. 97-12-087 (Santa Fe: Santa Fe Institute, 1997).

17. Rochlin, Trapped in the Net.

18. The change in Europe's case has been from 6.9 percent to 16.9 percent; in Japan's, it has been from 7 percent to 16 percent. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), "Data—ICT Investment in OECD Countries, 1980-2000," http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/20/2766404.xls.

19. Andreas Schafer and David Victor, "The Past and Future of Global Mobility," Scientific American, Vol. 277, No. 4 (October 1997), pp.58-61.

20. World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics, 2001 (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2001), Table II.1. Table II.1 can be located at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2001_e/its01_longterm_e.htm.

21. This comprises 30 percent of world trade in manufactures and is growing more rapidly than trade in finished products according to a recent study. Alexander J. Yeats, principal economist, Development Research Group, World Bank, "Just How Big Is Global Production Sharing?" January 1998, http://www.econ.worldbank.org/docs/347.pdf.

22. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2000), pp.171-173.

23. Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-first Century (New York: Random House, 1993), pp.65-81; Allen, Tainter, and Hoekstra, Supply-Side Sustainability, pp.351-369; and W. Brian Arthur, "Increasing Returns and the New World of Business," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 (July-August 1996), pp.100-109.

24. The lower productivity growth of the service economy is sometimes offered as an explanation for why mature economies grow more slowly. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p.165. Walt Whitman Rostow, The World Economy: History and Prospect (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), pp.270-273.

25. Allen, Tainter, and Hoekstra, Supply-Side Sustainability, pp.83-95. Health care costs increased 50 percent faster than the incomes of OECD states in the 1990s. "Health Spending Outpaces Economic Growth," OECD in Washington, No. 37 (September 2002), p.2. OECD, "Education at aGlance—OECD Indicators, 1998," November 23, 1998, http://www1.oecd.org/media/publish/pb98-42a.htm. Between 1990 and 1995, the cost of education rose more quickly than GDP in fourteen of nineteen OECD countries.

26. Michael E. O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2000), p.194.

27. Arthur, "Increasing Returns and the New World of Business," pp.100-109.

28. Allen, Tainter, and Hoekstra, Supply-Side Sustainability, p.368.

29. Indeed, it is possible that information technology has been an area of overinvestment. Rochlin, Trapped in the Net; and Roland Spint, "What Statistics Do and Do Not Tell Us About Economic Growth," OECD Forum 2003, http://www1.oecd.org/forum2003/speeches/spant.pdf.

30. This happened even as the level of world trade rose annually by 5.6 percent in the 1980s and 7 percent in the 1990s. World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics, 2001.

31. Spint, "What Statistics Do and Do Not Tell Us About Economic Growth."

32. Clifford Cobb, Ted Halstead, and Jonathan Rowe, "If the GDP Is Up, Why Is America Down?" Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 276, No. 4 (October 1995), pp.59-78; and Jonathan Rowe and Judith Silverstein, "The GDP Myth: Why 'Growth' Isn't Always a Good Thing," Washington Monthly, Vol.31, No. 3 (March 1999), pp.17-21.

33. Cobb, Halstead, and Row, "If the GDP Is Up, Why Is America Down?"; and Row and Silverstein, "The GDP Myth."

34. The slowing of growth in the tax base supporting the government in question aside, such circumstances are also suggestive of the government's own investments in complexity being to diminishing returns, as with its ability to provide social services.

35. "International Fiscal Comparisons," in Department of Finance, Canada, Fiscal Reference Tables, October 2002, http://www.fin.gc.ca/frt/2003/frt03_9e.html.

36. Central government outlays in the Group of Seven countries rose from 32.1 percent to 40.3 percent of GDP during the 1970-2002 period. Gross debt rose from 41.8 percent to 78.1 percent between 1977 and 2002. Although budget deficits shrank during the boom of the late 1990s, they have since returned to their former levels, running at 3.7 percent in 2002. Ibid.

37. OECD, "Education at a Glance—OECD Indicators, 1998"; Barry Bosworth, Prospects for Savings and Investment in Industrial Countries, Brookings Discussion Papers No. 113 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995); and OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 69 (June 2001), p.182.

38. Congressional Budget Office, "A 125-Year Picture of the Federal Government's Share of the Economy, 1950 to 2075," long-range policy brief, July 3, 2002, http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index?3521&sequence=0.

39. In the United States, mandatory spending rose from 32 percent to 59 percent of the federal budget between 1962 and 2002.

40. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2004-2013, http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4032&sequence=0. Old age spending alone is projected to rise by 3-4 percent of GDP by 2050 from the present level of 7.5 percent. OECD, Economic Outlook, pp.145-167.

41. Lester Thurow, The Future of Capitalism: How Today's Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow's World (New York: Penguin, 1996). The U.S. savings rate—an extreme example, but with parallels elsewhere—dropped from 8 percent in 1980 to 1 percent by mid-2002. Milt Marquis, "What's Behind the Low U.S. Personal Savings Rate?" Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Economic Letter, No.2002-09, March 29, 2002. Payments on debt as a percentage of household income have risen gradually from 12.46 percent in 1981 to 14.02 percent in 2003, driven largely by a steady rise in mortgage payments. Federal Reserve Board, press release, "Household Debt Service and Financial Obligations Ratios," http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/housedebt/default.htm. Debt as a proportion of income also rose from 56 percent to 81 percent of disposable income between 1983 and 1994—and 100 percent by the end of the decade. Glenn B. Canner, Arthur B. Kennickell, and Charles A. Luckett, "Household Sector Borrowing and the Burden of Debt," Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1995, p.323; and David Broder, "Our Crushing Personal Debt," Washington Post, September 1, 2002.

42. Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2003 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), p.116.

43. Federal revenue was 6.8 percent of GDP, compared with 18 percent in 2002. Debt relative to GDP was 52.4 percent in 1940, compared with 60 percent in 2002. Even in 1944, at the peak of spending during World War II, federal revenues were 20.9 percent of U.S. GDP, compared with 20.8 percent in 1999—tax levels being as high in peacetime during the 1990s as at the height of that conflict. Ibid.

44. Federal debt fell from 121.6 percent to 32.5 percent of GDP between 1946 and 1980. Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables.

45. Between 1952 and 1960, defense spending ranged from 9.3 percent to 14.2 percent of GDP, but during those same years gross debt dropped from 74.3 percent of GDP to 55.9 percent. Between 1981 and 1988, defense spending ranged from 5.3 to 6.5 percent of GDP, but the debt rose from 32.5percent to 51.9 percent, to eventually peak at 67.3 percent in 1996. Ibid., pp.116-117.

46. Peter Lieberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.25-28.

47. Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp.307-308.

48. Perrow, Normal Accidents, pp.93-96.

49. Montgomery C. Meigs, "Unorthodox Thoughts About Asymmetric Warfare," Parameters, Vol.33, No. 2 (Summer 2003), p.9.

50. Ibid.

51. "U.S. Battles Iraq Pipeline Blaze," BBC News, August 18, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3159135.stm.

52. Even then the resumption was only at partial capacity. "Iraq's Kirkuk Pipeline Needs Millions of Dollars' Worth of Repairs," CNEWS, March 9, 2004, http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/ World/Iraq/2004/03/09/375986-ap.html.

53. Industrial College of the U.S. Armed Forces, Strategic Materials, Industry Study 5240-18 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Spring 2002), http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/IS2002/2002%20Strategic%20Materials.htm.

54. Rochlin, Trapped in the Net, pp.35-50.

55. Brian S. Wesbury, "The Economic Cost of Terrorism," September 11, One Year Later: A Special Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, September 2002, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0902/ijge/ijge0902.htm.

56. Ibid.

57. U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, press release, "Financial Condition of America's Aviation Industry in Aftermath of September 11th Attacks to Be Focus of Congressional Oversight Hearing," September 20, 2002, http://www.house.gov/transportation/ press/press2002/release354.html.

58. "Boeing's Deliveries Off 28 Percent; Meets Lowered Goal," Boston Globe, January 6, 2003.

59. Paul Nyhan, "State Jobs: 9/11 Fallout Lingers," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 8, 2003, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/138439_terroreconomy08.html.

60. Cardiff University Business School, press release, "Employment Turmoil in the Aviation Industry," January 18, 2002, http://www.cf.ac.uk/news/releases/0201/020118.html.

61. One high estimate is that the attacks produced a 7.4 percent drop in tourism for 2001 and 2002, with a loss of 10 million jobs. World Travel and Tourism Council, press release, "End of the Tunnel in Sight for Travel and Tourism—Recovery Forecast Mid 2002," March 17, 2002, http://www.wttc.org/mediaCentre/020317%20End%20of%20Tunnel%20TSA%202002.htm.

62. Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, http://www .whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/, p.65.

63. One commonly cited estimate is $120 billion in damage to the U.S. economy alone. Wesbury, "The Economic Cost of Terrorism."

64. Perrow, Normal Accidents, p.73.

65. Seth Scheisel, "In Frayed Networks, Common Threads," New York Times, August 18, 2003. This attitude is not only deeply ingrained in business practices from Henry Ford and Frederick Winslow Taylor on, but is also consistent with current thought on risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. See Perrow, Normal Accidents, pp.306-315; and Rochlin, Trapped in the Net, pp.51-73.

66. Thurow, The Future of Capitalism, pp.279-309.

67. Scheisel, "In Frayed Networks, Common Threads."

68. Barry Eichengreen, "The United States and the World Economy after September 11," in Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer, eds., Understanding September 11 (New York: New Press, 2002), p.125.

69. Alberto-Laszlo Barabasi and Eric Bonabeau, "Scale-Free Networks," Scientific American, Vol. 288, No. 5 (May 2003), pp.60-69.

70. Ibid.

71. House Science Subcommittee on Technology, "The Love Bug Virus: Protecting Lovesick Computers from Malicious Attack," hearing report, May 10, 2000, http://www.nist.gov/hearings/2000/lovebug.htm.

72. Jean-Marie Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State, trans. Victoria Elliott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp.19-34.

73. Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002).

74. "Statement by U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner: Hearing on Security at U.S. Seaports, U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation," February 19, 2002, http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/ archives/feb192002.xml.

75. Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp.159-170.

76. Martin Libicki, "Rethinking War: The Mouse's New Roar," Foreign Policy, No. 117 (Winter 1999-2000), pp.30-43; and Michael T. Klare, "Waging Post-Industrial Warfare on the Global Battlefield," Current History, Vol. 100, No. 650 (December 2001), pp.433-437.

77. Libicki, "Rethinking War."

78. Nader Elhefnawy, "Four Myths about Space Power," Parameters, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp.131-132.

79. Zaki Laidi, A World without Meaning: The Crisis of Meaning in International Politics, trans. June Burnham and Jenny Coulon (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.105-122.

80. Keith Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996).

81. Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, p.65.

82. National Center for Policy Analysis, "Using the Private Sector to Deter Crime," Study No. 181, http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s181/s181b.html; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, "Expenditure and Employment Statistics," http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/eande.htm; and Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics,2001, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/.

83. Another cause of the airline industry's losses was the cost of elevated security measures required in the wake of the September 11 attacks, such as new baggage scanners that cost $4-$5 billion just to purchase. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 2001/2002 (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.48-49.

84. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), p.116. For a discussion of the phenomenon of "criminalized states," see Jean-Fran├žois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the Statein Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

85. Michael Howard, "'9/11' and After: A British View," Naval War College Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp.11-22.

86. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of theJoint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, House Report No. 107-792, December 2002, http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/24jul20031400/www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf.

87. Daniel Klaidman and Michael Isikoff, "Lost in Translation," Newsweek, October 27, 2003, p.28.

88. Ibid.

89. The Total Information Awareness (TIA) program, which involved the use of a computer system to "mine data" from private databases in search of signs of terrorist activity is an example of a program likely to be beleaguered by the sheer expansion of the quantity of available data. Dr. John Poindexter, "Overview of the Information Awareness Office," http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/poindexter.html. Although the TIA program was canceled, other data-mining programs remain. "Pentagon's Terror Research Shuffled to Other Agencies," USA Today, February 22, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-02-22-terror-projects_x.htm.

90. Rochlin, Trapped in the Net.

91. Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York: Viking, 1999); and Hans Moravec, Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

92. Lester R. Brown, Eco-Economy: Building an Economy for the Earth (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp.97-120; and Union of Concerned Scientists, "Lessons from the August 2003 Blackout," September 15, 2003, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/renewable_energy/page.cfm?pageID=1248.

93. James Fallows, Free Flight: From Airline Hell to a New Age of Travel (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001).

94. For some thoughts on this matter, see Thomas K. Adams, "Radical Destabilizing Effects of New Technologies," Parameters, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp.99-111. See also Douglass Mulhall, Our Molecular Future: How Nanotechnology, Robotics, Genetics, and Artificial Intelligence Will Transform Our World (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 2002); and Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology (New York: Anchor, 1986).

95. Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap.


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